Dr. Andrey Mihaylov
PhD in National Security and Adjunct Lecturer at NB
The European Union (EU) has entered a new political cycle marked by a commitment to strengthening defence readiness, reinforcing external border control, and adopting tougher positions on migration in order to ensure a more secure Europe.
The strong emphasis on defence and resilience signals a fundamental shift in the EU’s agenda toward strategic autonomy and a drive for greater geopolitical weight. Traditionally associated almost exclusively with the exercise of soft power, the EU increasingly recognises the need to act as a robust actor in addressing security issues. This evolution is a direct consequence of the war in Ukraine, which has intensified pressure on European unity and defence budgets. Uncertainty about external security guarantees—particularly whether the United States remains sincerely committed to Europe’s security—further pushes the EU to develop its own capabilities.
This necessitates deeper integration in defence policy, potentially leading to joint procurement, research and development, and even genuine operational capabilities that go beyond mere coordination. Such a strategic reorientation has direct implications for the EU’s engagement with its neighbouring regions, including the South Caucasus, as the EU seeks to more actively project stability, security, and influence.
The EU recognises two important elements: its own security begins “outside”, i.e., far beyond the borders of the member states; and projecting power and influence must become significantly more active. At the same time, it is confronted with internal and external contradictions, as well as budgetary constraints that hinder—or at the very least delay—the implementation of these core elements of its foreign policy.
The complexity of EU enlargement, illustrated by Georgia’s complete political reorientation, further deepens internal disagreements within the EU—raising the question: is it worth “investing” in expanding influence or even enlarging in the direction of the South Caucasus?
The interplay between economic difficulties, fiscal pressure, and the need to increase defence spending suggests an imminent resource allocation crisis within the EU, accompanied by even greater divisions regarding policy toward candidate states, or those aspiring to become candidates, including Armenia.
With limited financial resources, growing defence expenditures, and ongoing support for Ukraine, the EU may be forced to reduce funding for other priorities—including the development of regions such as the South Caucasus. This poses a risk of eroding the EU’s soft power and discouraging partner countries if development assistance declines.
The assumptions outlined above appear to form an unsolvable political and economic situation at first glance. Yet this situation also suggests a greater need for innovative mechanisms—new solutions—to preserve the EU’s authority and influence in the South Caucasus.
Challenges Shaping EU Foreign Policy – A World of Constantly Changing Conditions and Security Risks
The EU’s foreign policy is dynamically shaped by an ever-changing world defined by significant external challenges. The war in Ukraine, now in its fourth year, continues to place enormous pressure on European unity and defence budgets. Beyond Ukraine, conflicts in the Middle East—such as the war in Gaza (currently in a ceasefire phase but far from resolved, with long-term instability easily foreseeable)—as well as the sharp confrontation between Israel and Iran, also dominate the EU’s foreign policy agenda.
Transatlantic relations are likewise marked by uncertainty over future U.S. support for Ukraine, increasing pressure on Europe to strengthen its own defence capabilities.
The EU recognises that its security indeed begins beyond its borders and appears committed to taking greater responsibility for its own security and expanding its capacity for autonomous action amid global instability—at least at the level of political declarations. The practical steps remain to be seen.
This analysis outlines the risks but does not offer a basis for deep optimism.
The increased focus on autonomous action and assuming greater responsibility for security represents a strategic maturation of EU foreign policy. This shift is a direct response to rising global instability and reflects an understanding that traditional alliances do not always guarantee security. It implies a more stable, pragmatic, and (unfortunately) potentially less values-oriented foreign policy in certain contexts and regions, where geopolitical interests may take precedence over normative considerations—or at least be balanced with them. This, however, could lead to difficult compromises the EU may not be fully ready to make.
The EU’s Strategic Interests in the South Caucasus
The EU’s engagement in the South Caucasus is increasingly driven by its strategic imperative to promote stability, enhance connectivity, and diversify energy supplies in a region crucial for Europe’s broader security and economic interests.
The recently adopted EU Strategy for a Stable and Secure Black Sea Region (May 2025) serves as a cornerstone of this approach. The strategy explicitly identifies the Black Sea as a key gateway linking Europe with the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Mediterranean, highlighting its importance for international trade, food security, and overall geopolitical and energy stability.
Cooperation under this strategy is structured around three pillars:
1. Strengthening security, stability, and resilience;
2. Promoting sustainable growth and prosperity;
3. Supporting environmental protection, climate resilience, and civil protection.
The EU’s vision is to harness the potential of the South Caucasus as a corridor linking Europe with Central Asia, thereby stimulating economic growth, competitiveness, and—most importantly—diversifying energy supplies away from traditional sources. Behind the diplomatic language lies a clear political intent to project influence.
Beyond economic and infrastructure interests, the EU’s strategic engagement is driven by a broader ambition to counter external influence and support regional states in assuming greater responsibility for addressing their own challenges.
Deepening EU–Armenia Relations – The Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement
The Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA), signed in 2017 and in force since 2021, is the cornerstone of EU–Armenia relations. It elevates the partnership by regulating political and economic cooperation and gradually aligning Armenia’s legislation with the EU acquis.
CEPA encompasses enhanced political dialogue and cooperation across areas including justice, human rights, transport, energy, counter-terrorism, anti-money-laundering, and anti-corruption.
One of the first challenges, however, lies in the ongoing negotiations on visa liberalisation for Armenian citizens—talks that remain unresolved.
Armenia has demonstrated significant political will in recent months, with its parliament adopting a law (in spring 2025) officially initiating the process of EU accession. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has expressed his intention to apply for EU membership—though no formal application has yet been submitted. This legislative step responds to the March 2024 European Parliament resolution confirming that Armenia meets the requirements of Article 49 of the Maastricht Treaty, recognising CEPA as a roadmap for deeper integration, reforms, and potential sectoral integration with the EU market.
The shift from “partnership” to “integration” poses a challenge to the regional balance of power—a diplomatic way of saying it represents a direct challenge to Russia.
CEPA was designed as a comprehensive agreement but without a free-trade component due to Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Armenia’s openly stated aspiration toward EU membership directly contradicts its EAEU membership. This creates a strategic dilemma for both Armenia and the EU: how to support deeper integration without provoking a strong reaction from Russia or undermining Armenia’s economic stability, given its heavy dependence on Russia. The EU’s response will shape the credibility of its policy—one thing is certain: it must be concrete and backed by investment commitments.
Armenia’s European Vector – Opportunities and Challenges
Armenia’s deepening relations with the EU stem from its strategic interest in consolidation and security diversification, distancing itself from traditional alliances (especially Russia and the CSTO) and improving economic development. This interest became particularly visible after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and subsequent events, which revealed a significantly reduced perception of Russia as a reliable security partner.
The EU has gradually increased its engagement, particularly through the deployment of the EUMA monitoring mission. Public opinion is generally favourable toward the EU—March 2024 polling showed that 61% of Armenians view the EU positively.
However, Armenia’s path toward deeper EU integration is filled with serious challenges.
EU policy must balance democratic values with geopolitical realities, especially amid regional instability. The EU’s energy and economic partnership with Azerbaijan—particularly natural gas supply and transit connectivity—limits the space for political backing of Armenia and deeper engagement in defence and security issues.
Economic constraints are no less significant. Armenia’s economy remains structurally tied to the EAEU through trade, labour migration, and energy. Trade with Russia has increased sharply since 2021, making Russia Armenia’s largest trading partner (35–40%), while trade with the EU has dropped to about 7%. Russia controls key sectors, such as gas distribution, nuclear fuel supply, and power transmission infrastructure—providing strong leverage over Armenian politics.
Given the risks of leaving the EAEU, Armenia is unlikely to exit the union in the short term.
Armenia’s landlocked geography and reliance on Georgia (and potentially Azerbaijan and Iran) for transit restrict its ability to fully benefit from the EU market. Armenia is a textbook example of how geography shapes politics.
Although overall favourable, public opinion depends on tangible benefits. Visa liberalisation remains the top priority. Achieving it would reinforce trust in Armenia’s European trajectory and politically strengthen the Pashinyan government.
Relations with Georgia
As noted earlier, Armenia is geographically “locked”, and the suspension of Georgia’s EU accession talks further narrows Armenia’s strategic space. Georgia is Armenia’s gateway to Europe, making its geopolitical direction directly connected to Armenia’s European prospects.
A “Georgia–Armenia” dyad is emerging, but differing geopolitical orientations of the two governments risk breaking this dyad and turning Armenia into an operational arena for regional and even global rivalries—one of the major risks Armenia must manage.
Intensified EU–Armenia Partnership – Supporting Armenia’s European Path
For Armenia to truly turn toward the EU, Brussels must provide a reliable, tangible economic alternative that outweighs the benefits and risks of distancing itself from Russia.
The EU must offer substantial grants, investment guarantees, and technical assistance to soften the costs of transitioning away from the EAEU.
A key first step could be large-scale support for Armenia’s energy sector—modernising the power grid and generation capacity to reduce dependence on Russia. This would be a geopolitical move, not merely a technical one.
Long-term integration also depends on the reopening of Armenia’s border with Turkey. The EU should play a more active role in these normalisation efforts; without at least one functioning border crossing, deep integration with the EU is impossible.
The three major challenges for Armenia are:
1. Difficulties securing visa liberalisation;
2. Economic dependence on Russia;
3. Lack of diplomatic relations with Turkey.
Yet the opportunities remain significant—achieving visa liberalisation alone would give a major boost to integration.
Prospects and Risks
Between 2022 and 2025, Armenia’s foreign policy underwent a profound transformation—from relying on Russia as an unquestioned security guarantor to actively seeking new partners (the U.S., EU, France).
This culminated in 2025 with the U.S.-mediated Armenia–Azerbaijan declaration establishing a transit corridor (Zangezur, renamed in summer 2025 as TRIPP – Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity).
While this positions Armenia in a new geopolitical context, it also carries domestic political risks. Some segments of society see the agreement as excessive concessions. Increased U.S. influence will likely provoke countermeasures from Russia and Iran, including attempts to undermine the Pashinyan government.
Where is the EU in this multi-level chess game?
Since August 2025, a new factor has emerged: growing geopolitical competition between the U.S. and the EU in the Caucasus.
The U.S. offers Armenia a rapid, pragmatic package—including mediation and potential private-sector investment—while the EU emphasises long-term connectivity and regulatory frameworks, which is insufficient from Armenia’s perspective.
Armenia, judging by Pashinyan’s actions, prioritises pragmatism.
In a world shaped by major geopolitical and economic shifts, the EU must remain actively engaged in the South Caucasus as the most effective way to respond to global challenges. Neglecting the region would be a serious mistake—and for Bulgaria and the wider Black Sea region, such neglect could generate significant risks.