Author: Dr. Lyuboslav Kostov We are the country where “knock on wood” is a more reliable strategy than pragmatic economic policy. We are the place where asphalt melts faster than snow, and corruption is so institutionalized that if we removed it tomorrow, half of the economic processes would collapse from the shock of having to operate by the rules. And yet, you know what I think? While we complain about potholes, we forget that here you can travel from a mountain peak to the seashore in less time than it takes an American to get out of traffic in Manhattan. Bulgaria is the place where the internet is so fast that while in London they are still trying to load Google, here you’ve already downloaded the entire Zamunda archive. Bulgaria is not just tomatoes and cheese (although those are extremely important). We are a technological hub. There is a high probability that the software in your car or phone was written by a kid in a Sofia apartment drinking ayran and listening to rock music. We are the nation that gave the world the father of the computer. Moreover, we gave literacy to over 250 million people and saved Slavic culture from extinction. We have more plant species per square kilometer than almost any other European country. We lie on an ocean of healing water. We rank second in Europe in the number of mineral springs. While others are figuring out how to purify wastewater, we are wading in health. We are the only country that has not changed its name since 681. Not because we are lazy, but because we knew who we were even then. We have survived Byzantines, five centuries of Ottomans, world wars, and socialist experiments. We don’t just survive—we are like couch grass in the garden of history. You can trample us, you can spray us with chemicals, but next spring we’ll be there again, greener and more alive than ever. The truth is that Bulgaria is beautiful because it is raw and real! It is not a sterile office in Brussels or a concrete jungle in Dubai. It is alive. It is a chaos of intelligent people who speak three languages but swear in one. They will say we are backward? Maybe. But here we still have the luxury of knowing our neighbors by name, eating tomatoes that haven’t passed through a laboratory, and spending three hours at dinner discussing everything and anything. If this is backwardness, keep your “progress” to yourself. We are a people who can curse our country 364 days a year, but on March 3rd you will see tears in the eyes of even the biggest cynic when they hear the bagpipe. We are not a country of subjects—we are a family of rebels just waiting for someone crazy enough to lead us in the right direction. And when that happens, the rest of the world will have to take notes. [...]
The US and Israel declared regime change as their ultimate goal. That, however, would be difficult to achieve. Аutor: Jasim Al-AzzawiSourse:AlJazeera Earlier today, the United States and Israel launched an attack against Iran, hitting targets across the country. In their televised speeches, US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made clear that they are after regime change, not military pressure to secure a deal.The attack and Iran’s swift response underscore just how precarious the diplomacy has become. The outbreak of war followed mediators’ announcement of a significant “breakthrough” in negotiations, with talks set to resume next week. Clearly, diplomacy was never meant to succeed and was merely used to mask war plans.Recommended StoriesFrom the timing of the attack, it is apparent that Washington and Tel Aviv had already made up their minds weeks ago. Israeli media reported that the operation had been coordinated with Washington to come ahead of the Purim holiday, which commemorates the biblical story of the Jewish people being saved from mass killing in ancient Persia.While both Trump and Netanyahu are clearly after a “victory” declaration, whether they can actually achieve it is unclear.Targeting the Iranian leadershipIsrael and the US have claimed to have focused on taking out civilian and military leadership and military installations. Perhaps the hope is that they can bring the war to a quick end.Israel claimed that it had achieved “very high success” in eliminating Iran’s leadership, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian among those targeted. Photos have already emerged of a major strike on Khamenei’s secure compound. Israeli media have reported the killing of General Mohammad Pakpour, a commander in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Ali Shamkhani, adviser to the supreme leader, and Amir Nasirzadeh, Iran’s defence minister.Israel is clearly trying to reassure its citizens that it has the capability of reaching deep into Iran’s top layer of leaders.But there has been no confirmation of leadership deaths so far from Tehran. Iranian media have claimed that Khamenei and Pezeshkian are safe and has reported instead on an air strike on a girls’ school in the city of Minab, with a death toll of at least 80.Unlike the 12-day war last June, when Iran’s retaliation was slow and measured, this time around, the Iranian armed forces retaliated almost immediately. Ballistic missiles were fired at US bases in Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, as well as Israeli cities like Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Eilat.The speed of Iran’s retaliation indicates that it had anticipated these attacks and had its retaliation plans ready. The question now is whether Iran can outlast US resolve, which faces both domestic and international pressure.Get instant alerts and updates based on your interests. Be the first to know when big stories happen.Domestic dangersTrump launched the war on Iran amid little enthusiasm among Americans for another foreign conflict. A recent poll by YouGov and The Economist suggests that just 27 percent of the US public supports the US using military force against Iran. Another survey conducted by the University of Maryland registered even lower approval: 21 percent.The war has significant domestic political ramifications for Trump. As the operation progresses, if Iran fails to surrender, the US president will be caught between getting bogged down in a protracted conflict by escalating, and being seen as weak if he backs down.As the midterm elections approach, the war will become a litmus test for Trump’s presidency. If the conflict does not go as the president has envisioned, it could reflect poorly on the Republican Party in the polls. If the GOP loses control of Congress to the Democrats, it would prevent Trump from pursuing his political agenda. Democrats gaining control of Congress could pile more impeachment pressure on Trump.What is victory?No analyst thinks this war will be short. Unlike the 12-day war, which resulted in a ceasefire, this conflict already looks broader and deeper. Iran’s readiness to retaliate across the region suggests it is willing to wage a long war rather than compromise.One problem Washington and Tel Aviv are facing is how to keep the pressure on Tehran without creating uncontrollable instability in the region. The other problem they have is that they put regime change as their ultimate goal.In his speech announcing the attack on Iran, the US president appeared to suggest that the US army would stick to an aerial campaign and would not deploy troops on the ground. He appeared to put the responsibility for toppling the Iranian government in the hands of the Iranian people, saying “the hour of your freedom is at hand” and calling on them to rebel.This call comes two months after Iran witnessed unprecedented mass protests across the country. The Iranian authorities, however, launched a brutal campaign of repression, killing thousands. At the moment, a similar wave of mass protests seems unlikely. That legacy of repression weighs heavily on society, and Iran appears resilient.Meanwhile, leadership “decapitation strikes” by the US and Israel will likely continue, but even if successful, they would not produce regime change.Eventually, Trump’s generals may advise that prolonged conflict is unsustainable, echoing the lessons of the 12-day war. For Trump, an unwinnable war would invite a familiar exit strategy: Declaring victory on Truth Social and shifting the narrative.The challenge then would be how to negotiate a ceasefire. Having been misled twice by the smokescreen of negotiations, Tehran could use this double betrayal to harden its position. If the regime survives, it could exploit US desperation for renewed talks to extract concessions. In that sense, diplomacy’s collapse today may set the stage for Iran to negotiate from a position of strength tomorrow. [...]
Аutor: C. Raja MohanSourse: Foreign Affairs C. RAJA MOHAN is a Distinguished Professor at the Motwani-Jadeja Institute of American Studies at Jindal Global University.This essay emerged from the Lloyd George Study Group on Global Governance. From Washington to Beijing and Moscow to New Delhi, a consensus is emerging that the world has entered a multipolar era. Political leaders, diplomats, and analysts routinely declare that unrivaled American dominance has ended and global power is now dispersed across multiple centers. The assertion has become so commonplace that it is often treated as a self-evident fact rather than a proposition to be examined. Even officials in the United States, long the principal beneficiary of the unipolar post–Cold War order, have adopted this language. At the start of President Donald Trump’s second term, Secretary of State Marco Rubio observed that Washington’s moment as the sole superpower was historically “not normal” and that the international system would inevitably tend toward multipolarity. Rubio’s statement appeared to echo the growing belief in China, Russia, and much of the developing world that the United States’ power is declining and its long-standing global primacy is unsustainable.This seeming convergence obscures a difference in how the various players define “multipolarity.” For the Trump administration, acknowledging multipolarity doesn’t mean accepting limits on American power. Instead, it serves as a justification for abandoning the traditional U.S. conception of global leadership and the responsibilities that come with it. The idea of multipolarity allows Washington to pursue a narrower, more transactional foreign policy—one focused on extracting advantage rather than underwriting order, unconcerned with the maintenance of institutions or norms that do not serve immediate American interests. For China, Russia, and many developing countries, by contrast, multipolarity is not merely descriptive but aspirational. It is a political project aimed at constraining American dominance, eroding Western-led institutions, and constructing alternative models of governance, development, and security in which the United States is not the only country in charge.The idea of multipolarity has been popular since the United States emerged as the sole dominant power at the end of the Cold War. After the 1990–91 Gulf War, which revealed the scale of American military superiority, French leaders warned of the dangers posed by the American “hyperpower.” China and Russia later transformed this critique into a strategy, seeking to organize resistance to U.S. primacy. They established what they declared to be a “strategic partnership” in the late 1990s and formed the multilateral BRICS alliance along with Brazil, India, and South Africa to coordinate among non-Western powers. They believed that such efforts could accelerate the transition away from American hegemony.Trump’s return to office made the arrival of a multipolar moment seem inevitable. The United States was internally divided, economically unsettled, and weary of global commitments. China’s economy had grown to nearly the same size as that of the European Union, and the country had become a formidable technological leader in its own right. Russia’s war in Ukraine had demonstrated Moscow’s willingness to use force to revise borders in Europe. And BRICS had expanded to include new members in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, reinforcing the impression of a rising alternative system to counter American dominance. Many observers concluded that the multipolar world had arrived and that American unipolarity was living on borrowed time.A year later, however, this conviction appears misplaced. The Trump administration has embarked on a forceful reassertion of American power by imposing onerous tariffs, intervening in other countries, and brokering peace negotiations and commercial dealmaking across the world. China and Russia have resisted Washington on select issues, but they have been unable to mount a comprehensive challenge to the United States’ effort to restructure global rules. Washington’s European allies have proved even less able to stand up to the United States. Facing Trump’s insults and pressure, they have wilted and caved.The reality is that the world is still unipolar. The illusions of multipolarity have not created a more balanced international arrangement. Instead, they have done the opposite: they have empowered the United States to shed previous constraints and project its power even more aggressively. No other power or bloc has been able to mount a credible challenge or work collectively to counter U.S. power. But unlike in the prior period of unipolarity that emerged at the end of the Cold War, the United States is now exercising unilateral power shorn of responsibilities.POLE POSITIONClaims that the world is becoming multipolar rely on observable indicators of the growing strength of emerging powers, including shifts in relative shares of global GDP and the construction of new development and governance institutions headquartered outside the United States and Europe. These changes show that power is distributed more widely today than at the end of the Cold War. But they do not necessarily signify a transformation in the structure of the international system.Defined narrowly, a pole is a state or bloc that possesses comprehensive capabilities to shape the international system. A pole is not merely influential in one or two domains, such as nuclear warfare or trade, but rather must be capable of projecting military power globally, sustaining technological and industrial leadership, anchoring alliances, shaping norms, providing public goods, and absorbing systemic shocks. When measured against this more demanding standard, the number of genuine poles in the world today is the same as it has been for the past 35 years: one. Only the United States has this global reach and power.With an economy now at $30 trillion and growing between two and three percent annually, the United States remains the world’s foremost economic engine. Its defense expenditures—around $1 trillion in 2025—exceed those of the next several major powers combined. Washington retains a unique ability to project its power: it has an unparalleled network of alliances, military bases, and logistics infrastructure across the world. American firms dominate frontier sectors as varied as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and biotechnology. U.S. universities are central nodes in global innovation networks, and American cultural industries shape narratives and tastes worldwide.The number of genuine poles in the world today is the same as it has been for the past 35 years: one.Constraints on American power—high national debt, domestic political division, frictions with U.S. allies, and resentment against U.S. policies in the so-called global South—are real and growing, but they do not negate the United States’ position as the only credible pole in the system. Even Trump’s threats to cut the funding of domestic universities and research agencies, for instance, are unlikely to destroy their preeminence. The depth of the U.S. private sector and the strength of its civil society limit the damage that any president can cause. And the United States’ enviable geography, which includes ample natural resources and physical distance from the Eurasian landmass that has long been the main theater of global conflict, gives the United States a large margin of error in its foreign policy choices.Many analysts argue that the world is evolving toward bipolarity as China continues to rise. In its 2025 National Security Strategy, for instance, the United States acknowledged that China is a “near peer.” China has become a major economic and technological power: its economy has reached about two-thirds the size of that of the United States, its nuclear arsenal is estimated to have tripled in size since 2020, and it is building up its military to counter U.S. influence along the first island chain stretching from Japan to the Philippines in the western Pacific.Yet China remains some distance from being a true pole in the international order. Its growth rate is slowing and is likely to slow even further because of demographic decline and the outsize role of state-owned enterprises in its economy. Its currency lacks global reach: few international transactions are conducted in renminbi because of strict capital controls and a lack of financial transparency. China’s military has strengthened its position in East Asia but lacks the logistics networks, access to bases, and alliances required to project power worldwide. And its much-heralded development programs, most notably the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, have supplemented rather than replaced U.S.-anchored global governance institutions such as the World Bank.Russia, often portrayed as a cornerstone of multipolarity, possesses even fewer of the attributes required to shape the international system. Although it has nuclear weapons and a good deal of conventional military power, its economy is narrowly dependent on natural resources, it has fallen far behind in developing emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and robotics, and, like China, it faces a declining population. The European Union, another potential pole, has economic clout but remains politically divided and dependent on the United States for its security. Europe is now trying to make amends by ramping up defense spending, but even in the best-case scenario, it will have to rely on U.S. military power for many years to come.The so-called middle powers—Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—are growing in economic weight and regional political influence, and are increasingly represented in global forums such as the G-20. Yet influence does not confer pole status. India, which has the size and potential to become a great power in the long term, has a per capita GDP of less than $3,000 (compared with about $85,000 in the United States). It faces deepening political divides and suffers from weak institutions, underdeveloped human resources, and entrenched bureaucratic resistance, all of which have stymied reforms to accelerate economic growth and improve governance. Facing conflict with Pakistan on one border and tensions with China on another, India will still need an economic and security partnership with the United States and its allies for the time being.Efforts to build countervailing coalitions to the United States have also faltered. Despite China’s and Russia’s claims that they have a “no limits” partnership, their relationship rests on uneasy foundations and is shaped by historical mistrust and asymmetric dependence. In the early stages of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the “elder brother” on which communist China depended for political support; now, Russia is the junior partner, heavily reliant on China for imports of industrial and dual-use goods—those valuable for both military and civilian purposes, such as machine tools—and as a market for its energy exports. BRICS has also expanded, and the list of countries seeking to join is long. But BRICS is not a cohesive coalition, nor is it likely to position itself against the United States. Instead, most of its members are eager to strike deals to work with Washington. The inclusion of numerous pairs of regional rivals—India and China, Iran and Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Ethiopia—also limits the effectiveness of BRICS as a geopolitical tool to pursue any particular strategic objective.AMERICA UNLEASHEDThe first year of Trump’s second term has punctured the narrative of American decline and the rise of multipolarity. Trump’s assertive use of economic, diplomatic, and military power to push U.S. interests highlights the extraordinary freedom of action the United States enjoys. The weak international response to Washington’s aggressive trade policies, its interventions in Latin America and the Middle East, and its threats to take new territory have exposed how difficult it is for any coalition to mount effective resistance to the United States. Power is spread more widely across the international system than it was at the end of the Cold War, but that diffusion makes it harder to channel collective action against Washington.When Trump began dismantling the multilateral trading system by imposing across-the-board tariffs in April 2025, most major trading powers did not push back. The European Union, for instance, chose accommodation over confrontation. Invoking the need for U.S. support in the war in Ukraine, EU leaders accepted Washington’s tariff demands with little protest—an episode that the former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis compared to the Qing dynasty’s submission to unfair British treaties in 1842 that launched China into what became known as its “century of humiliation.” Japan and South Korea, meanwhile, agreed to invest $550 billion and $300 billion, respectively, in the United States while granting Washington leeway over how to spend the money and manage the returns. India, which was hit with a 25 percent reciprocal tariff and an additional 25 percent penalty for purchasing Russian oil, refused to yield on many U.S. demands but was careful to avoid any public argument with Washington.Only China retaliated. Beijing’s decision to restrict exports of rare-earth elements, which the United States depends on for many advanced manufacturing components, forced Washington to the negotiating table and led to an agreement to de-escalate the tit-for-tat tariff war. Although Beijing’s power play showed its growing leverage over Washington, China has been unable to force the United States to lift many of the onerous economic and technology sanctions it has imposed over the past decade, including curbs on Chinese companies’ access to U.S. chips. [...]
Author: Andrey Sergeyevich ShishkovSource: Russian Institute for Strategic Studies In early December 2025, the White House released a new National Security Strategy that places significant emphasis on Latin America. The section devoted to world regions begins precisely with the Western Hemisphere, which indicates its priority importance for the Donald Trump administration. The document contains numerous revelations regarding Washington’s objectives in Latin America and the methods for achieving them. First and foremost, the United States declares that it is restoring and even strengthening the Monroe Doctrine in order to achieve dominance in the Western Hemisphere and prevent external actors from controlling strategically important assets, as well as from deploying forces and facilities in Latin American countries that could pose a threat to the United States. In addition, key objectives of U.S. policy are declared to be the termination of illegal migration from the region, the neutralization of drug cartels, and the strengthening of security, stability, and economic cooperation in the Western Hemisphere, including in the sphere of critically important minerals. According to the National Security Strategy, in order to achieve these goals the United States intends not only to work with its “longstanding friends” but also to expand its influence by cultivating relations with new partners. In the view of the document’s authors, Washington’s policy should be aimed at supporting U.S. allies in Latin America who can help create an “acceptable level of stability within their states and beyond.” The White House promises to reward those Latin American governments, political parties, and movements whose actions align with U.S. principles and objectives. At the same time, as noted in the document, the United States will also engage with leaders holding different views when common interests exist. Special attention in the new edition of the National Security Strategy is devoted to economic cooperation between the United States and Latin American states. It is noted that Latin America possesses important resources that the United States seeks to develop jointly with the countries of the region. In this regard, the U.S. National Security Council has been instructed to immediately begin compiling a list of such assets for the purpose of their protection and joint exploitation with regional partners. The authors of the strategy emphasize that the United States must take measures to ensure that Latin American countries view the U.S. as their preferred trading partner. It is also openly stated that Washington intends to obstruct, by various means, the interaction of Latin American states with extra-hemispheric actors. The document notes with regret that external powers have gained significant influence in Latin America in recent years. The authors of the strategy acknowledge that it will not be easy for the United States to completely push them out of the Western Hemisphere; nevertheless, the Americans intend to make every possible effort to squeeze out foreign companies that are constructing infrastructure facilities in Latin America. Although China is not mentioned directly, it is evident that it is the primary target implied by the authors of the document. The new strategy also raises the issue of reconfiguring the global military presence of the United States. Acknowledging that the United States cannot afford to devote equal attention to all regions of the world, Washington proposes to build up forces in the Western Hemisphere to counter threats allegedly emanating for the United States from Latin America. Within this framework, the Americans plan to strengthen security cooperation with Latin American states, including arms sales, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and other measures. Overall, the approaches outlined in the Latin American section of the new U.S. National Security Strategy fully correspond to the course pursued by the Trump administration in Latin America in 2025. During this period, the United States undertook a number of steps to limit the influence of the People’s Republic of China in the Western Hemisphere, in particular by launching active efforts to displace Chinese companies from the port infrastructure of the Panama Canal. The United States actively cooperated with the most friendly Latin American leaders, maneuvered in its relations with others—especially Brazil—and increased pressure on its adversaries from the Bolivarian Alliance. In the economic sphere, threats of tariffs and the actual imposition of high duties were combined with the conclusion of trade and investment agreements with close partners. Thus, in November of the current year, the White House proposed new agreements to Argentina, El Salvador, Ecuador, and Guatemala, which, among other things, provide for expanded access to the U.S. market. Issues of countering illegal migration and drug trafficking from Latin America also occupied an important place on the Latin American agenda of the second Trump administration in 2025. Following the publication of the new version of the National Security Strategy, many experts raised the question of how Latin America would respond to such a policy by Washington in the region. To answer this question, it is necessary to take into account the complex domestic political processes underway in Latin American states. The current leaders of Latin American countries can be conditionally divided into several groups with regard to their relations with the Trump administration. The most friendly toward Washington at present are the presidents of Argentina, El Salvador, Ecuador, and Paraguay (J. Milei, N. Bukele, D. Noboa, and S. Peña, respectively). The new president of Bolivia, R. Paz, the head of Guatemala, B. Arévalo, and the leader of Costa Rica, R. Chaves, are also striving for close partnership with the United States. They are likely to be joined soon by Chilean politician J. Kast, who is considered the clear favorite in the second round of Chile’s presidential elections. At the same time, in the two largest countries of the region—Mexico and Brazil—left-wing presidents are in power, and their relations with the Trump administration are complex. C. Sheinbaum and Lula da Silva are ideologically far removed from the Republicans; however, Brazil and Mexico are strategically important countries for the United States in the Western Hemisphere, and therefore Washington continues to engage with them across a broad range of issues. Finally, the White House regards the leaders of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua—M. Díaz-Canel, N. Maduro, and D. Ortega—as its opponents and even enemies; in recent months they have been joined by Colombian President G. Petro. The United States is increasing pressure on these states and does not rule out the use of forceful methods against them. Analysts are also actively debating how realistic and achievable the goals of the current Republican administration in Latin America are. On the one hand, the implementation of Trump’s Latin American agenda is facilitated by the ongoing “rightward shift” in the region. Nearly all of the most significant elections in Latin America in 2025 ended in victories for right-wing forces, which may build on their success during the 2026 electoral cycle. At the same time, it is unlikely that Trump will be able to resolve many of the ambitious tasks outlined in the National Security Strategy within his remaining years in office. It should also not be forgotten that, despite the current political environment, not everyone in Latin America views Trump’s policies positively. Anti-American sentiment and strong notions of national sovereignty are characteristic of a significant portion of Latin Americans. For example, the majority of Brazilians reacted negatively to the tariffs imposed by Trump against their country, and perceptions of the United States in Brazil deteriorated. In turn, in a referendum in Ecuador, more than 60 percent voted against allowing foreign states to establish military bases on Ecuadorian territory, despite President Noboa having reached a preliminary agreement with the Trump administration on this issue. In conclusion, it should be noted that no U.S. president since the end of the Cold War has paid as much attention to Latin America as Trump did in the first year of his second term. It appears that many of the policy approaches developed by the current U.S. administration may be used by future American leaders who succeed the current occupant of the White House, especially Republicans. This will also be facilitated by the fact that the course pursued by Washington in the Latin American region over recent decades has largely exhausted itself—a point previously highlighted by analysts close to the Democratic Party. [...]
The Danish prime minister was sinking in the polls. America’s Greenland grab changed everything. Autor: Sebastian Starcevic and Jakob Weizman Sourse: Politico The question now is whether Mette Frederiksen will call an election anytime soon to capitalize on her political gains Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has one person to thank for rescuing her from a looming political abyss: U.S. President Donald Trump. Frederiksen’s party has seen a dramatic surge in poll ratings through January — just months after awful results in last year’s local elections — as it launched a vehement defense of Denmark’s sovereignty against Trump’s aggressive threats to annex Greenland. “After a long time, they have finally drawn a clear line instead of appearing submissive,” said Per Clausen, a left-wing Danish MEP from the opposition Enhedslisten party, who credited the change in approach with driving a leap in voter support. The phenomenon is not unique to Denmark. In elections from Canada to Australia, standing up to Trump has become electoral rocket fuel, as leaders who frame themselves as defenders of national sovereignty and liberal democracy are being rewarded by voters eager for pushback against the U.S. president. Frederiksen’s center-left party — which governs in a coalition with the center-right Moderates and Venstre parties — netted 22.7 percent of the vote and 41 parliament seats in a new poll by Megafon, a reputable Danish consultancy, conducted from Jan. 20 to 22 among 1,012 Danes. That’s a sharp upswing from the last poll by Megafon in early December, which showed Frederiksen’s party winning just 32 seats. The Social Democrats currently hold 50 seats out of 179, and the latest polls show that it would still be the largest party in parliament with 41 seats, putting them back in pole position to lead coalition talks, but leaving them dependent on partners to maintain power. The uptick in support is even more notable given that the Social Democrats suffered a terrible result in municipal elections in November, which saw Frederiksen’s party lose Copenhagen, a symbolically important seat, for the first time in 100 years. The Moderates, led by Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen, nearly tripled its vote share in the poll from 2.2 percent to 6.4 percent, equal to about 12 seats. Another poll published Monday by the research institute Voxmeter for Danish news agency Ritzau showed support for Frederiksen’s Cabinet at 40.9 percent, the highest in two years. If an election were held now, the coalition would be forecast to win 73 seats. That would still leave them 17 seats short of the 90 needed for a majority and needing to negotiate with other parties — but is far from what just months ago looked like an imminent wipeout. Rally around the flag Since then, the world — and Danish politics — has changed dramatically. Trump said in early January that he would seize Greenland, a self-ruling Danish territory in the Arctic, by any means necessary, an oft-repeated threat that took on new menace after the American capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro. Frederiksen, who has been in power since 2019, has mounted a spirited diplomatic defense of the Arctic island, successfully repelling Trump’s advances for now. And, according to the polls, Danes have rallied around her. Standing up to Trump has become electoral rocket fuel, as leaders who frame themselves as defenders of national sovereignty and liberal democracy are being rewarded by voters. | Mads Claus Rasmussen/EPA “There isn’t really another explanation for it,” said Anne Rasmussen, a political science professor at King’s College London and the University of Copenhagen, referring to the surge in support. “It’s first and foremost Greenland.” Rasmussen said the last time Denmark experienced such a wave of solidarity with its government was during the Covid pandemic, adding that national crises tend to favor incumbents. “I do think many Danes are currently moving towards the Social Democrats because the party is delivering on its core priorities … while also demonstrating strong leadership when even the most powerful man in the world challenges sovereignty,” said Danish MEP Christel Schaldemose, who hails from Frederiksen’s Social Democrats party. Frederiksen’s government also reached an agreement this week with left-wing parties to hand out €600 million in tax-free food vouchers to more than 2 million people hit by rising food prices. Tick tock The question now is whether Frederiksen will call an election anytime soon to capitalize on her political gains. Under Danish electoral law, the vote must be held before Nov. 1. Frederiksen has gambled with an early election before, holding a snap vote in 2022 amid falling support, which saw her snag victory. “It might look like a little bit too instrumental to do it in the middle of the biggest foreign policy crisis for Denmark and the world order … but it’s probably very likely that it will come before the summer,” Rasmussen said. “She will still wait a little bit, but I don’t think she will wait that long.” Frederiksen cut an influential figure in Brussels, especially during Denmark’s presidency of the Council of the EU in 2025, but had faltered domestically thanks to missteps ranging from her decision to cull Denmark’s entire population of 17 million minks to prevent the spread of Covid-19, to the dubious jailing of a former intelligence chief, providing an electoral opportunity for the opposition. The leader of Denmark’s right-wing Danish People’s Party, Morten Messerschmidt, told POLITICO that he would welcome earlier elections, calling them “a valuable opportunity” for the country to form a new government. Frederiksen, whose approval rating plummeted from 79 percent in 2020 to 34 percent in a December YouGov poll, rejected speculation that she would resign following the disastrous local elections in November. “They really had a bad election,” Rasmussen said, but added the government has since moved to address voters’ concerns on the cost of living with the food voucher scheme. That’s important because Frederiksen’s Greenland boost in the polls won’t last forever. “I don’t think it’s just going to sort of disappear overnight, but you can imagine that as some of the national issues again become more prominent on the agenda, people are going to base their judgments more on them when they think about who to vote for,” Rasmussen said. Frederiksen, who has been in power since 2019, has mounted a spirited diplomatic defense of the Arctic island, successfully repelling Trump’s advances for now. | Sean Gallup/Getty Images Rune Stubager, a professor of political science at the University of Aarhus, agreed that the Greenland crisis had caused “kind of a rallying effect,” but added “once the pressure subsides, I would, however, expect the government to drop again as attention would then turn to domestic issues.” Stine Bosse, a Danish MEP and member of the Moderates, said Frederiksen and the government’s handling of transatlantic tensions over Greenland would stand them in good stead. “This is probably the most difficult foreign policy situation Denmark has faced in many years, and the government has handled it in the best possible way,” said Bosse. “They have kept a cool head, a warm heart, and demonstrated a high level of professionalism.” [...]
Author: Vladimir Konstantinov The fate of the Islamic Republic is not only Iran’s problem. The earthquake shaking Tehran may have consequences beyond its borders—and those consequences are already beginning to be felt. Neighbors fear that the collapse of the regime could trigger further instability across the entire Middle East. Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a long-standing rival of Iran, prefers to adopt a cautious stance precisely for this reason. On the one hand, Ankara knows that a weakened Tehran helps expand its sphere of influence in the region, and Erdoğan certainly would not oppose Donald Trump. On the other hand, however, Turkey is also aware of what a possible collapse of the Republic would mean. It fears an explosion of instability along its border and the activation of minorities, especially the Kurds. Ankara is also concerned about a potential strengthening of Israel, which remains a strategic rival, as confirmed above all by the problems in Syria and the Gaza Strip. The Jewish state, on the other hand, is the first country in the region affected by what is happening in the Islamic Republic. Benjamin Netanyahu has always regarded Iran as his main adversary and a problem that must be resolved as quickly as possible. At his latest meetings with Donald Trump, they once again discussed the need for intervention to paralyze the ayatollahs’ missile and nuclear programs. Yesterday, after the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were placed on combat readiness, the prime minister convened a security meeting to review all attack plans. The meeting took place just hours after the U.S. president himself called on Iranian protesters to continue their demonstrations and announced that “help” would “arrive soon.” The Israeli government considers the issue a priority. Tehran’s ballistic and nuclear ambitions are the most important element of Israel’s regional agenda, together with the network of militias and allied governments that for years has constituted Iran’s true strategic weapon. The “war on seven fronts” has so far given Israel a clear advantage. But after the 12-day war, Netanyahu also knows that Iranian missiles could penetrate the Jewish state’s air defenses and endanger the population in a year in which elections will be held. The crisis and the potential for war or regime collapse also worry Iran’s two main allies and partners: China and Russia. These two powers view Trump’s actions as a threat to their respective Eurasian spheres of influence, following the blow he dealt in Latin America. Yesterday, Iran’s Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, met with his Russian counterpart Sergei Shoigu to “strengthen cooperation” between Moscow and Tehran. The two countries have signed a strategic partnership. It is well known that Iran has been supplying weapons and drones to Russia during the war in Ukraine. The question arises: will Vladimir Putin be able to provide significant assistance to the ayatollahs while he himself is waging a war? Meanwhile, the Moscow Times reported an increase in private jets flying from Tehran to Moscow and a possible relocation of part of Iran’s gold reserves to the Russian capital. The Federation cannot afford another strategic “slap” after Bashar al-Assad and the capture of Nicolás Maduro. Beijing cannot afford the same either, after reacting angrily yesterday to Trump’s decision to impose 25% tariffs on anyone trading with Iran. “We have always believed that there are no winners in a trade war, and China will resolutely defend its legitimate rights and interests,” said Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning. But for Chinese leader Xi Jinping, the issue appears extremely complex. The Islamic Republic is a strategic partner of the People’s Republic of China. Iran’s land corridor is crucial for Chinese goods. Tehran is a key component of the BRICS bloc and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—two systems that form the pillars of China’s foreign agenda. And the multipolar world for which Beijing has been working tirelessly is beginning to hear an alarming warning bell from American activity. From Maduro’s fall to ambitions for Greenland and the issue of tariffs, China has always been in Trump’s sights. And a scenario in which Iran increasingly moves westward deeply worries the “Dragon,” which in recent years has built solid relations with the Islamic Republic based on oil and gas, in exchange for technology and tools to circumvent sanctions. But to sum up: Trump is entering territories in which other great powers—Russia and China—have interests. His indifference to the conflict in Ukraine is therefore understandable. For now, one of the players is preoccupied with it, but when the Russians achieve their goals, the game will change. Then the two colossi will present the bill—and Trump does not like to pay. [...]
Autor: Will Freeman Sourse: Foreign Affairs WILL FREEMAN is Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. On January 3, U.S. forces did something many observers thought impossible: they quickly captured and arrested Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela’s wily, seemingly coup-proof autocrat. For years, Maduro had proved himself an expert in authoritarian survival—crushing at least nine military mutinies and outlasting American economic pressure. But early Saturday morning, he fell practically without a fight. Delta Force helicopters took limited fire as they flew low over Caracas rooftops to Maduro’s bunker, where U.S. troops stormed inside, grabbed him and his wife, and whisked them to an aircraft carrier. Hours later, both were behind bars in New York, facing drug and weapons charges. No American lives were lost, although at least 80 Cubans and Venezuelans, including some civilians, were killed. The whole operation looked so easy that many analysts have reasonably wondered whether regime insiders abetted Maduro’s extraction, in effect staging a palace coup by proxy. At the same time, the operation was a dramatic display of U.S. President Donald Trump’s willingness to cast aside what’s left of the so-called rules-based international order and use military force to assert U.S. dominance over the Western Hemisphere. In the days since, Venezuelans living abroad have celebrated ecstatically. But the country itself has remained quiet. Most people seem to recognize that it’s possible little has really changed. Trump, after all, has left Maduro’s regime largely intact, recognizing Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president, as interim president before she had even publicly accepted the position herself. The question is whether the shifts will remain relatively modest, or if Maduro’s extraction presages bigger changes within both Venezuela and the region. There is a wide variety of possibilities. Maduro’s removal might facilitate Venezuela’s transition to democracy, tank Cuba’s regime, and advance Trump’s bid to assert U.S. hemispheric dominance. Alternatively, a reshuffled Maduro regime might simply accept more deportees from the United States and give Washington control over its oil reserves, but otherwise change little. The regional shock waves could be limited. In fact, the inability to fundamentally change Venezuela might end up revealing the limits of American power. But the eventual outcomes will probably fall somewhere in between these two extremes. In the short-term, the consequences for Venezuela will likely be muted, as Trump tries to work with the reconfigured regime to secure his top objective: access to oil. Other Latin American governments might retaliate with words, but most will avoid responding with deeds so as not to incur Trump’s anger. As time goes on, however, the situation may become more fraught. Trump might attack Venezuela again, especially if Rodríguez is unwilling or, constrained by other regime figures, unable to comply with his directives. Venezuelan oil shipments to Cuba will likely decrease, weakening (although not necessarily collapsing) the island’s already flagging regime. Colombia could face American intervention, given that its left-wing president—unlike most of its neighbors—seems eager to fight with Trump and that Trump welcomes this dispute. And critically, Latin American countries, especially the larger, more geographically distant ones, may try to further diversify their economic and security relationships to reduce their exposure to an assertive and demanding Washington. Trump’s attack, in other words, could advance or set back his hemispheric dream. Top of Form Bottom of Form PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE To figure out how Venezuela and the region might change, analysts should first pay attention to the breadth of the Trump administration’s demands of Venezuela’s reshuffled leadership. That will require looking less at the orders and aspirations Trump lists off the cuff in public, which are bound to vary, and more at the reports and leaks about what he and his team are privately pressing Caracas to deliver. One possibility is that these demands will be narrow: opening up Venezuela’s oil reserves to long-term U.S. control and investment, sidelining certain geopolitical rivals, including Iran and Cuba, and getting Caracas to accept an increased number of deportees. Trump alluded to such a scenario in his January 3 press conference, when he stressed the importance of Venezuela’s oil and evinced little interest in the restoration of its democracy. In fact, Trump barely mentioned Venezuela’s opposition; when he did, it was only to say that the opposition leader and recent Nobel Peace Prize-recipient, Maria Corina Machado, was insufficiently “respected” to run the country. By contrast, Trump suggested Rodríguez, a longtime loyalist to Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chávez, could make her country “great again.” Trump also said that a group of administration officials would “run” Venezuela, although the administration later declared that he meant Washington would run it indirectly by threatening the Maduro regime’s remaining leaders into complying with American demands. Such a limited U.S. agenda might satisfy many members of Trump’s team, including Vice President JD Vance, the top policy adviser Stephen Miller, and others skeptical of nation-building projects and more focused on domestic priorities. Trump might also perceive this path as the most doable and least unpopular with Americans, only a third of whom said they supported the use of military force to remove Maduro in a January 5 poll. One congressional staffer, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told me, “We just saw a trade deal with a change of leaders.” But other Trump allies have signaled they will press for harder, more ambitious shifts: namely, an eventual end to Venezuela’s Bolivarian socialist regime and a return to democracy, likely through negotiations. Such figures include Secretary of State Marco Rubio and important Republicans in Congress. Although Trump seems less interested in democracy, Rubio clearly has his and other administration officials’ ears on matters related to Latin America and may be able to convince them that a democratic transition will serve their interests. Republican lawmakers, for their part, might persuade Trump that pursuing only narrow, oil- and migration-centric goals will hurt the party electorally. That could especially prove true among Latino voters in Florida eager for regime change in Venezuela and Cuba, many of whom already feel betrayed by the harsher than expected implementation of Trump’s deportation policies. (Miami just elected a Democratic mayor for the first time in nearly 30 years.) The Latin American regime under the greatest immediate pressure may not be Venezuela’s. Trump’s decisions will also depend on what choices Venezuelan officials make next. If they defy the White House by refusing to hand over oil rights or to reduce ties with Cuba, Washington might again attack the country, as Trump has repeatedly stated. But cooperation seems the likelier path. Rodríguez, in particular, has a reputation for pragmatism. She may have condemned Washington’s attacks, but such statements could reflect a need to appease regime hard-liners and would-be rivals, such as Diosdado Cabello, the minister for interior, justice, and peace. They could also be designed to distract from suspicions that she helped turn Maduro in. Either way, they should not be taken at face value. According to reporting by The Miami Herald, last year, Rodríguez and her politically influential brother, who was just reappointed as head of the National Assembly, put forward a plan to U.S. officials in which she would replace Maduro and work with the United States, in exchange for keeping his system in place. (Rubio, according to the report, blocked the deal.) Rodríguez is also less committed to Cuba than Maduro was, which news outlets suggest is the result of her frustration with Cuba’s failure to reliably pay Venezuela for its oil shipments. At least some Trump administration officials told The New York Times off the record they think they can work with her. In fact, if she or other regime officials did secretly collude with the United States to turn over Maduro—as seems possible—then cooperation with Washington may already be underway. Trump has another incentive to keep his demands of Rodríguez narrow: if he does, she is more likely to agree to them. Most U.S. officials probably do not want to attack Caracas again. It is a move that, rather than compelling obedience, could easily sow chaos. A narrow deal—support for Rodríguez in exchange for more oil and less aid to Havana—is thus the path of least resistance for both sides. Of course, for Venezuela to cooperate with either narrow or broad demands, someone has to be in control of the country. Right now, that remains the Rodríguez siblings. But they face powerful potential challengers—most notably Cabello, who wields influence over Venezuela’s armed paramilitaries, or colectivos, as well as over the country’s national police and parts of its intelligence apparatus. He may want to stop Caracas from cooperating with the White House, which views him with great suspicion. (Cabello was indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice for drug trafficking, alongside Maduro.) If Cabello cannot get Rodríguez to follow his requests, he could try either to depose her or to make the country ungovernable. In that case, much would depend on what the head of Venezuela’s armed forces, Vladimir Padrino López—the regime’s third power center—opts to do. As of now, it is impossible to say who he might side with, or whether he could keep the military unified if infighting seriously intensifies. POWER PROBLEMS If Rodríguez works with Trump and maintains control of her country, then the Latin American regime under the greatest immediate pressure may not actually be Venezuela’s. Instead, it could be Cuba’s. The island is dependent on Venezuelan assistance, and it was in dire straits even before Trump had Maduro captured. The Cuban economy is in tatters. Tourism, its primary industry, has shrunk to at least half its pre-pandemic levels with no signs of rebounding. Crime and disease are on the rise as law enforcement and hospitals break down, thanks to insufficient financing. The island’s government has withstood enormous pressure before. But it is facing its greatest-ever crisis. The most immediate risk for Cuba’s rulers is energy. The island relies heavily on imported fuel, much of it sourced from Venezuela, to power its electrical grid, which is teetering on the brink of failure. Over 40 percent of the country goes without energy during peak hours. Some provinces have power for just two to four hours a day. If Washington now cuts Cuba off from almost all Venezuelan oil—the U.S. naval blockade having already stopped some shipments—the grid could collapse. Havana will surely look to other countries to step in, but it is unlikely to find many suppliers. Mexico sends some oil currently, but less than in previous years. With Trump repeatedly threatening to attack Mexican territory, its officials are unlikely to increase supplies now. Brazil doesn’t seem inclined to replace Venezuela either, since leftist President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known as Lula, who is running for reelection next year, knows that doing so would undermine his newly improved relationship with Trump and potentially invite election meddling. Russia, strained by its invasion of Ukraine, and China are also unlikely to fill the vacuum. If Havana, usually protected from prolonged blackouts, plunges into darkness, the regime could face mass protests as large as or larger than those of July 2021. (The 2021 demonstrations, the first of their scale in decades, showed the depth and breadth of public anger.) Such protests might prove tough to contain, especially if they played out in dense Havana neighborhoods. Cuba’s security forces frequently engage in brutal methods of smothering unrest—detention, torture, threats. But they have never shot and kill dozens of people at a protest. It is unclear what would happen if that changed and whether protests might cascade. Trump has threatened to use direct military force against Colombia. Still, it’s entirely possible the regime could survive even this dire situation. The Cuban military has immense stakes in the government’s survival, given that it controls much of the economy through a web of companies that would vanish after a political transition. And it seems no one on the island is in a position to challenge the armed forces. As with Maduro’s regime, deposing Cuba’s communist regime might require a U.S. military operation—a maneuver that neither Trump nor the American public seemingly has much appetite for. The president, for example, recently stated he believes the Cuban regime will fall on its own, without direct U.S. involvement. Trump has, however, threatened to use direct military force against Colombia. He has said the country is “run by a sick man, who likes making cocaine and selling it to the United States, and he’s not going to be doing it for very long.” Colombian President Gustavo Petro, unlike the Venezuelan and Cuban leaders, was democratically elected. He is a leftist ideologically opposed to Trump and who was at times friendly with Maduro. Yet Petro is not changing his behavior. To the contrary, he has relished the confrontation, both because it gives him a much-sought international pedestal and because he thinks it will help his political successor. Colombia’s presidential election is just months away, and Petro’s preferred candidate, Iván Cepeda, is likely to face scrutiny over the current government’s unmet policy promises. Petro is eager to shift the conversation away from domestic challenges, and squaring off against Trump serves that purpose. There are reasons to doubt that Trump will make good on his threats against Bogotá. Washington seems to expect that a conservative president will win in May. The United States also relies on Colombia, its main Latin American security partner, to help with much of its regional counternarcotics efforts, even if current U.S.-Colombian tensions have obstructed them. But Trump is unpredictable, and if Petro continues to forthrightly respond to U.S. actions in Venezuela, Trump could intervene forcefully in some way. AMERICAS FIRST? Beyond Cuba, Colombia, and of course Venezuela, Maduro’s removal may have more limited near-term consequences. Lula criticized Washington’s strikes, but his government quickly recognized Rodríguez as interim president and made no real effort to defend Maduro. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, another leftist and occasional Maduro apologist, likewise has other priorities: navigating upcoming trade renegotiations and avoiding U.S. military strikes on Mexican soil against drug cartels. Mexico’s dependence on trade with the United States sharply limits her room for maneuver. This silence indicates that much of the Western Hemisphere is, for now, Washington’s domain. For years, analysts have watched China make inroads in the region and argued that U.S. influence was slipping. But Maduro’s seizure suggests that past administrations—out of caution, respect for law and norms, and sometimes neglect—simply didn’t exercise the substantial leverage that Washington has long possessed. It is uncertain, however, whether Trump’s intervention in Venezuela will become a testament to American power or expose its limits, and eventually contribute to its erosion. Many countries are already responding to Trump’s punitive use of tariffs by hurrying to strengthen diplomatic and trade ties with Asia and Europe. Some states, including Brazil and Colombia, are experimenting with building closer defense and tech ties, respectively, with China. Maduro’s extraction may accelerate these trends. Trump could also lose interest in Washington’s so-called near abroad, moving on to other items on his international agenda. The administration’s recently issued National Security Strategy puts the Western Hemisphere above every other region, and Maduro’s capture and the massive U.S. naval buildup in the Caribbean suggests that this ambition is not simply rhetoric. But this reallocation of assets may or may not endure. Outside of Rubio, few officials in the Trump administration seem personally invested in an “Americas first” foreign policy that goes beyond more regional security cooperation and increased deportations. What Trump does next in Venezuela and the Caribbean will thus be very telling. His interventions will test just how far U.S. power to shape hemispheric affairs reaches. [...]
Author: Dr. Ilko Semerdzhiev Overview of Bulgaria’s GDP for the Period 2005–2025 Due to the constant manipulation by Boyko Borissov—especially regarding verifiable facts related to the country’s economy—I took the trouble to review the official reports on the execution of the State Budget (the Consolidated Fiscal Program) for the period 2005–2024. First, the use of 2005 to calculate GERB’s contribution is misleading and, in essence, represents a public deception. Why? Because in that year Borissov only became Mayor of Sofia, and his so-called “contribution” to GDP actually amounts to appropriating the results of the government of Sergey Stanishev, whose mandate began on 17 August 2005 and lasted until 27 July 2009. That government left the country with a GDP of BGN 73.181 billion, or EUR 37.417 billion. Borissov’s first government had a mandate from 27 July 2009 to 13 March 2013, with the following indicators: 2010 – GDP of BGN 74.888 billion; 2011 – GDP of BGN 81.126 billion; 2012 – GDP of BGN 82.643 billion.On average, this amounts to 3% annual GDP growth. Borissov’s second government had a mandate from 7 November 2014 to 27 January 2017, with the following indicators: 2015 – GDP of BGN 89.571 billion; 2016 – GDP of BGN 95.349 billion.Again, the average annual GDP growth was 3%. Note:It turns out that the government of Plamen Oresharski and the caretaker governments of Marin Raykov and Georgi Bliznashki, over two years (2013 and 2014), generated GDP growth of BGN 26.883 billion, while Borissov, over the three years of his first mandate, achieved an increase of only BGN 7.755 billion. Borissov’s third government had the following indicators: 2017 – GDP of BGN 102.683 billion; 2018 – GDP of BGN 109.526 billion; 2019 – GDP of BGN 119.686 billion; 2020 – GDP of BGN 120.979 billion.The average annual GDP growth was 3.7%. In the period 2021–2024, six caretaker governments alternated, along with the governments of Kiril Petkov and Nikolai Denkov, with the following indicators: 2021 – GDP of BGN 139.537 billion; 2022 – GDP of BGN 168.354 billion; 2023 – GDP of BGN 184.875 billion; 2024 – GDP of BGN 204.907 billion.On average, this represents 8% annual GDP growth. 2025 – GDP of EUR 112.903 billion, or BGN 220.819 billion—only BGN 15.9 billion more than in 2024, and entirely accumulated through debt, which exceeds the reported growth. Conclusion: Borissov has no grounds whatsoever to claim Bulgaria’s economic growth as his own. On the contrary, the contribution of his governments from 2010 amounted to an increase from BGN 75 billion to BGN 120 billion by 2020, and if we subtract the BGN 27 billion growth achieved by the governments of Oresharski, Raykov, and Bliznashki, what remains is a mere BGN 18 billion increase for the period 2010–2020. The increase from 2021 to 2024 amounts to BGN 65.370 billion. Recapitulation: Over 11 years, from 2010 to 2020 inclusive, Borissov’s governments increased GDP by BGN 18 billion; The subsequent governments, from 2021 to 2024 inclusive, increased GDP by BGN 65 billion in just 4 years. Boyko Borissov’s boasts are unfounded. [...]
Аutor: JUAN S. GONZALEZ Source: Foreign Affairs JUAN S. GONZALEZ served in the U.S. Department of State from 2004 to 2016 and as Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs on the National Security Council from 2021 to 2024. FRAGMENTATION WITHOUT RESOLUTION Maduro’s removal does not mean the collapse of Chavismo—the hybrid ideological, political, and criminal system built around the Bolivarian project of Hugo Chávez (Maduro’s predecessor, who first came to power in 1999 and died in office in 2013) and sustained through patronage, repression, and illicit finance. The regime was never a single structure. It was a coalition, held together by access to rents and a shared fear of retribution. With Maduro gone, that coalition will splinter. But splintering is not the same as political transition. The decisive variable is the armed forces. There is little evidence of a clean institutional break suggesting a rapid transfer of power. A more likely scenario is prolonged bargaining, selective defection, and hedging. Some commanders will seek accommodation with whatever authority emerges. Others will dig in, betting that uncertainty works in their favor. Civilian power brokers—governors, party officials, economic intermediaries—will follow the same calculus. Venezuela’s constitution offers a narrow, contested path forward. It calls for new elections within 30 days following a presidential vacancy, while also recognizing the results of the July 2024 vote that Maduro refused to honor—a vote that produced a clear opposition victory for Edmundo González, a former diplomat chosen to run in place of opposition leader, María Corina Machado, a victory widely recognized abroad but never enforced at home. The tension between constitutional procedure and political reality captures the core challenge ahead: legality alone will not resolve the transition without enforcement and buy-in from those who still control coercive power. A peaceful transition remains possible. It will require calibrated pressure, credible guarantees, and a willingness to prioritize reintegration over blanket punishment. Otherwise, spoilers will emerge—not only ideological hard-liners, but rational actors acting in self-preservation. Complicating matters is the ecosystem Maduro left behind: traffickers, corrupt officials, armed groups, security actors. These entities are deeply embedded in the state and economy. Removing the figurehead does not dismantle the system. THE NEXT FOREVER WAR? Failure would be costly, for both the United States and Venezuela. A rapid U.S. disengagement risks leaving Venezuela in limbo—ungoverned, unstable, and continuing to hemorrhage people and capital. Staying too long carries a different danger: entanglement in a low-grade conflict that drains U.S. attention, legitimacy, and political will. This is the paradox of intervention: too little invites chaos, too much invites quagmire. The margin for error is thin, and the costs of miscalculation would be felt far beyond Venezuela’s borders. A protracted crisis would create space for additional external intervention. Iran and Russia have leaned on security ties. China has played a longer game—focused on infrastructure, finance, and market access. A heavy-handed U.S. military presence could unintentionally strengthen Beijing’s position by reinforcing the perception that Washington offers coercion while China offers development. This is where the “Donroe Doctrine” falls short. Military power is no longer the most effective tool for shaping outcomes in Latin America and the Caribbean. It may have been in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the United States imposed order through occupations and gunboat diplomacy. But today, the contest for influence in the hemisphere is no longer primarily military. It is economic and technological. China recognized this years ago, embedding itself in supply chains, ports, power grids, and digital infrastructure—often stepping in where Washington relied on sanctions or lectures. Without economic follow-through, military primacy will not drive China out of Venezuela or the region. It will encourage hedging. If oil revenues are diverted externally, political sovereignty will be hollow. Regional and global reactions to the U.S. strike make clear the importance of what happens next. Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico have condemned the U.S. move, even as many Venezuelans openly celebrate Maduro’s removal. European responses—from Brussels, London, and Paris—have been cautious rather than critical: broadly supportive of the outcome, but reserving judgment on the methods and the aftermath. Support for Maduro’s removal is real. Endorsement of how the United States manages what follows is conditional. The balance sheet, rather than the battlefield, will prove to be the more decisive arena—and here, Trump’s instinct to reward political allies risks diverting capital and control away from the long-term investment required to rebuild Venezuela’s economy. The country has lost more than three-quarters of its GDP in a decade. Oil production has collapsed, even as the country continues to have some of the most extensive reserves in the world (the largest by some measures). Public services barely function. No post-conflict recovery effort in the hemisphere approaches this scale. In that context, control over oil revenues is not a technical issue—it is the central determinant of whether any future government can govern at all. If those revenues are diverted externally, political sovereignty will be hollow, regardless of elections. Control over Venezuelan oil carries global implications. Even under optimistic assumptions, infrastructure decay, capital constraints, creditor claims, and political risk will slow production growth in the short term. Over time, however, Venezuelan supply could meaningfully alter global balances. In that scenario, Washington would become a de facto participant in shaping global oil markets—functionally inserting itself into the logic of OPEC+ without formal membership. This is an opportunity for the United States to compete where it holds real advantages. Economic statecraft—not military dominance—will determine whether Venezuela’s reintegration strengthens U.S. influence or undermines it. Stabilization will require far more than sanctions relief. It demands private investment, debt restructuring, restored energy production, and integration into the technological shifts reshaping the global economy. Latin America and the Caribbean stand on the edge of structural change—in artificial intelligence, health care, clean energy, and advanced manufacturing. Venezuela must participate in that future, or remain trapped in extraction and dependency. THE PATHS AHEAD Three broad scenarios appear likely in the immediate aftermath of Maduro’s forced exit. The first path is a managed transition. Elections may proceed, but whether a single opposition figure emerges as a viable governing leader remains uncertain. Machado’s political momentum, although real, does not automatically translate into governing authority in a post-Maduro landscape shaped by institutional decay, security players with veto power, and unresolved power balances. Exile, fragmentation, and fatigue have weakened the opposition bench. Power could instead coalesce around an interim authority or technocratic arrangement acceptable to key domestic actors, including elements of the former regime and the armed forces. This scenario offers the best chance of stabilization, but only if paired with rapid economic relief and credible security guarantees. The second path is criminalized continuity. Much of the regime’s coercive and criminal architecture remains intact. Armed groups and traffickers continue to operate. Political change becomes cosmetic, while instability persists. Power could be formally handed to a civilian placeholder—such as Vice President Delcy Rodríguez—who offers international interlocutors procedural continuity while preserving the underlying networks that sustained the regime. Early signals would include selective prosecutions, quiet assurances to security elites, and the preservation of control over key revenue streams rather than their reform. The third path is escalation. Power struggles turn violent, armed actors proliferate, and the United States—having claimed ownership—faces pressure to intervene again. What begins as stabilization risks becoming another open-ended commitment. Which path prevails will depend less on the operation that removed Maduro than on the U.S. strategy that follows. Venezuela is now a test—not just of American power, but of American judgment. The temptation to declare victory and move on will be strong. So will the impulse to control outcomes directly. Both must be resisted. If Trump and Rubio succeed, they will reshape hemispheric politics and validate a hard-edged vision of U.S. leadership. If they fail, the costs will echo for years—fueling migration, empowering adversaries, and reinforcing skepticism about American intervention. Venezuela’s future will be decided not by Maduro’s removal, but by the discipline, restraint, and economic imagination applied in its aftermath. [...]
Аutor: JUAN S. GONZALEZ Sourse: Foreign Affairs JUAN S. GONZALEZ served in the U.S. Department of State from 2004 to 2016 and as Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs on the National Security Council from 2021 to 2024. The United States’ use of military force to remove Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro marks a turning point for Venezuela and for U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere. But it would be a mistake to confuse drama with resolution. Images of Maduro in U.S. custody create the impression of finality. Yet this is not the beginning of the end of Washington’s long struggle with Venezuela. It marks the end of the beginning, and the start of a far more difficult and perilous phase. The Trump administration is treating the removal of Maduro as a tactical success that speaks for itself, even as it deliberately assumes responsibility for what comes next. President Donald Trump has been explicit about that choice. By announcing that the United States will “run Venezuela” for a while, he is not merely projecting confidence. He is intentionally assuming responsibility for the political, economic, and security consequences that follow. History offers a warning. In May 2003, President George W. Bush stood beneath a “Mission Accomplished” banner and declared victory in Iraq. What followed was not stabilization, but fragmentation—an insurgency, a legitimacy crisis, and years of costly entanglement. Venezuela now sits at a similar inflection point. Removing Maduro could open the door to a durable transition. It could just as easily draw the United States into a dangerous quagmire. If Washington manages the next phase with discipline—combining coercion with incentives, and force with political legitimacy—it could reset Venezuela’s trajectory, pull the country back into the community of democracies in the hemisphere, and reassert U.S. influence in a region that has spent the past decade hedging against American power. If this happens, the payoff would be substantial. Venezuela’s collapse over the past two decades has been the single largest driver of irregular migration, transnational crime, corruption, and illicit financial flows in the hemisphere, negatively affecting U.S. interests. Stabilization would address those problems at their source rather than at the U.S. border. It would also shut down a permissive environment that allowed the Maduro regime to commit systematic crimes against its own population—crimes that hollowed out Venezuelan society while exporting instability abroad. And it would deprive U.S. adversaries (including China, Iran, and Russia) of a strategic foothold. But achieving such an outcome will take a degree of skillful policy and fortunate circumstance that are far from assured in any administration. The plausible paths of failure include a partial transition that leaves criminal networks intact, a prolonged period of political limbo that sustains migration and instability, or a creeping security commitment that the United States never intended but finds difficult to unwind. What happens next will determine whether this moment becomes a hinge in hemispheric history or another entry in the long catalogue of American overreach. THE GAMBLE The operation that ended Maduro’s rule carries the unmistakable imprint of Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. It reflects a worldview that prizes decisiveness, spectacle, and payoff—political and economic alike. For Trump, Venezuela is less a foreign policy problem to be managed than an asset to be exploited. The United States, he insists, will “run the country,” extract and sell Venezuelan oil, and convert geopolitical leverage into tangible return. This is mercantilism, unapologetically applied: statecraft blurred with profit, and opportunity created not just for U.S. firms but also for political allies and intermediaries close to power in particular. Those instincts are already shaping expectations in the energy sector. Beyond Chevron, U.S. companies such as ConocoPhillips—long mired in litigation over expropriated assets—are widely expected to reenter Venezuela. But Trump’s room to maneuver is narrow. Most producing fields are already contractually awarded, including to Chinese firms that will insist that those agreements be honored. This constrains Washington’s options and increases the temptation to bypass Venezuela’s future government altogether. If the United States instead seeks to capture Venezuelan state oil revenues directly, it will leave little fiscal space for domestic reconstruction—effectively ensuring that Washington “runs” Venezuela regardless of who formally holds office. Maduro’s removal does not mean the collapse of chavismo. For Rubio, the stakes are different but no less significant. For years, he has argued that incremental pressure only entrenched the regime while expanding Chinese, Iranian, and Russian influence. This moment offers a chance to prove that hard power can deliver outcomes where diplomacy and sanctions failed and to reshape the terms of debate over U.S. leadership in the hemisphere. If the bet pays off, the implications extend well beyond Caracas. It would validate what critics have labeled the “Don-roe Doctrine,” a Trump-era reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine that favors unilateral enforcement over multilateral restraint. It signals that Washington is prepared to reassert primacy in its near abroad, even at the cost of institutional friction and diplomatic discomfort. This would force a recalibration across Latin America and the Caribbean, reminding governments that U.S. disengagement is a choice, not a constraint—and that American power, when exercised, can be decisive enough to leave them few options for open opposition. It would also embolden Washington advocates who favor strategic and commercial results over diplomatic process and persuasion in hemispheric policy. But that logic rests on assumptions forged in another era. The Monroe Doctrine worked when U.S. power was unrivaled in the hemisphere and external competitors were distant. That world no longer exists. [...]
Аutor: Elizabeth Economy Sourse: Foreign Affairs OUT IN THE COLD The deep ocean is hardly the only frontier that Xi wants to master. In 2014, he also declared his intent to make China a great polar power. Like the seabed, the Arctic is rich in natural resources, containing an estimated 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil supplies, 30 percent of its undiscovered natural gas, and significant stores of rare-earth elements. As the ice there melts, it will also be home to new shipping corridors—like the one used by the Istanbul Bridge. In a 2018 white paper on the Arctic, Beijing promised to build a “polar Silk Road” by developing such routes and investing in the region’s resources and infrastructure. It also reframed Arctic governance to include issues such as climate change and to advance the rights of non-Arctic countries. “The future of the Arctic concerns the interests of the Arctic states, the well-being of non-Arctic states, and that of humanity as a whole,” the paper declared. “The governance of the Arctic requires the participation and contribution of all stakeholders.” Beijing’s interest in the Arctic is not new. In 1964, China established the State Oceanic Administration, a government agency whose mandate included conducting polar expeditions. Its Arctic-related research accelerated in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1989, the government founded the Shanghai-based Polar Research Institute, and it expanded its Arctic research capabilities and partnerships throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. In 2013, China became an observer to the governing Arctic Council, which consists of representatives of Canada, Denmark (which includes Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States, as well as indigenous peoples. Since then, China has become one of the council’s most active observer members, participating in a wide array of working groups and task forces. Chinese researchers continue to argue that China should play a larger role in Arctic decision-making because climate change has made the Arctic an issue of global commons and because Chinese companies are essential to Arctic shipping and energy. Beijing’s efforts have encountered resistance. Arctic countries have grown concerned about becoming overreliant on Chinese investment and the resulting security risks. Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden all rejected or canceled a number of Chinese Arctic projects in their territories. According to a 2025 study by the Belfer Center, of China’s 57 proposed investment projects in the Arctic, only 18 are active. But while democratic countries have mostly closed themselves off to new Chinese investment, a different kind of state has opened its doors: Russia. Since 2018, China and Russia have institutionalized their bilateral consultations on the Arctic. Their relationship became especially pronounced after Moscow invaded Ukraine in 2022 and was economically isolated from the rest of the Arctic Council’s members. Since then, Chinese companies have signed agreements to develop a titanium mine and a lithium deposit, as well as to construct a new railway and deep-water port. Together, China and Russia’s capabilities for Arctic exploration, commerce, and patrol far exceed those of the United States. China has also used its partnership with Russia to enhance its military access to the region. Starting in 2022, the two countries have even conducted multiple joint exercises, including in the Bering Sea, the Chukchi Sea, and the greater Arctic Ocean, as well as a joint bomber patrol near the coast of Alaska. Beijing and Moscow have also teamed up to bring the BRICS more directly into Arctic discussions. They established a BRICS working group on ocean and polar science and technology, and Russia has invited the body to develop an international scientific station on the Svalbard archipelago. China’s outreach, however, has come up short. Brazilian and Indian engagement with the Arctic has been primarily through bilateral partnerships with Russia. Some Indian analysts have expressed outright concern about China’s expanding role in the region. And despite the seeming alignment between China and Russia, Moscow has not supported Beijing’s pitch for an expanded role in Arctic governance. Their shared military exercises are largely performative. In 2020, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s special envoy to the Arctic Council, Nikolai Korchunov, agreed with then U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s comment that there are two groups of countries, Arctic and non-Arctic, and suggested that China had no Arctic identity. That same year, Moscow charged a Russian professor who studies the Arctic with high treason after he provided China with classified materials relating to submarine detection methods. BOLDLY GO WHERE NO ONE HAS GONE BEFORE Then there is the final frontier: space. As early as 1956, China deemed space exploration a national security priority. On the heels of the Soviet and U.S. satellite launches in 1957 and 1958, Chinese leader Mao Zedong pronounced, “We too shall make satellites.” The country then followed through, launching Dong Fang Hong 1 into orbit in April 1970. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, China created an extensive space program driven by scientific, economic, and military imperatives. In 2000, the government published its first white paper outlining its priorities in outer space. They included making use of the resources of space, achieving crewed spaceflight, and undertaking space explorations centered on the moon. Space is also a particular priority for Xi. “Developing the space program and turning the country into a space power is the space dream that we have continuously pursued,” he said in 2013. In 2017, China laid out a road map to become a “world-leading space power by 2045,” with planned major breakthroughs. It has delivered: in addition to its advancing commercial space program, China has developed sophisticated space warfare capabilities, including a growing constellation of reconnaissance, communications, and early warning satellites. Of the more than 700 satellites that China has placed in orbit, over one-third serve military purposes. The country’s 2022 white paper heralded all this progress. Some U.S. space officials and experts believe that China will surpass the United States as the leading space-faring nation within the next five to ten years, including by being the first to return humans to the moon since the U.S. Apollo 17 mission in 1972. As with the deep seabed, China’s significant technological capabilities and the frontier’s more open governance enable Beijing to play a significant leadership role in space. Beijing has become an important partner for other less developed countries interested in space research and exploration. It boasts bilateral agreements with 26 states. It also collaborates with the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs to carry out experiments from its Tiangong space station. Beijing’s most meaningful bid for space leadership, however, is the planned International Lunar Research Station, a joint effort between China and Russia first announced in 2017. It is slated to begin as a permanent base at the moon’s south pole and eventually expand into a network of orbital and surface facilities supporting exploration, resource extraction, and long-term habitation. China aims to get 50 countries, 500 international research institutions, and 5,000 overseas researchers to join the ILRS by offering them opportunities for scientific training, cooperation, and access to some Chinese and Russian space technologies. To that end, it has pitched the ILRS through multilateral organizations, such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Beijing and Moscow have positioned the ILRS as an alternative to the U.S.-led Artemis program—Washington’s attempt to get back to the moon—and to the Artemis Accords. The accords, established in 2020 by the United States and seven other countries, set forth nonbinding principles and guidelines for peaceful space exploration, the use of space resources, the preservation of space heritage, interoperability, and the sharing of scientific data. The accords are designed to be consistent with existing international space treaties and conventions; as of early November, 60 countries have signed on. One senior Chinese expert described the accords as an American attempt to colonize and establish “sovereignty over the moon.” But China has been relatively unsuccessful at drawing countries into its venture. The ILRS has attracted only 11 states in addition to China and Russia, several of which have either no space program or only a nascent one. Two of the countries that joined the ILRS, Senegal and Thailand, later also joined the Artemis Accords. The broader appeal of the latter stems from several factors. Unlike the ILRS, the accords build on existing scientific, security, and commercial relations between NASA and other countries. They provide smaller states with opportunities to advance their own space industries. They offer clear norms of transparency, interoperability, and data sharing, and they do not entangle countries in Russia’s isolation from much of the world’s economic and scientific endeavors. Finally, unlike with the ILRS, countries that sign the Artemis Accords will have an opportunity to send their astronauts to the moon through NASA’s lunar program. [...]
Аutor: Elizabeth Economy Sourse: Foreign Affairs ELIZABETH ECONOMY is Hargrove Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. From 2021 to 2023, she served as a senior adviser on China policy at the U.S. Department of Commerce. Before that, she spent over a decade as a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. She is the author of The World According to China and The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State. When the Chinese cargo ship Istanbul Bridge docked at the British port of Felixstowe on October 13, 2025, the arrival might have appeared unremarkable. The United Kingdom is China’s third-largest export market, and boats travel between the two countries all year. What was remarkable about the Bridge was the route it had taken—it was the first major Chinese cargo ship to travel directly to Europe via the Arctic Ocean. The trip took 20 days, weeks faster than the traditional routes through the Suez Canal or around the Cape of Good Hope. Beijing hailed the journey as a geostrategic breakthrough and a contribution to supply chain stability. Yet the more important message was unstated: the extent of China’s economic and security ambitions in a new realm of global power. Beijing’s efforts in the Arctic are just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. As early as the 1950s, Chinese leaders discussed competition in the world’s literal and figurative frontiers: the deep seas, the poles, outer space, and what the former People’s Liberation Army officer Xu Guangyu described as “power spheres and ideology,” concepts that today include cyberspace and the international financial system. These domains form the strategic foundations of global power. Control over them determines access to critical resources, the future of the Internet, the many benefits that derive from printing the world’s reserve currency, and the ability to defend against an array of security threats. As most analysts focus on the symptoms of competition—tariffs, semiconductor supply chain cutoffs, and short-term technological races—Beijing is building capabilities and influence in the underlying systems that will define the decades ahead. Doing so is central to President Xi Jinping’s dream of reclaiming China’s centrality on the global stage. “We can play a major role in the construction of the playgrounds even at the beginning, so that we can make rules for new games,” Xi said in 2014. Beijing has positioned itself well for this contest. It approaches these frontiers with a consistent logic and playbook. It is investing in the necessary hard capabilities. It is partnering with other countries to embed itself in institutions and flooding these bodies with Chinese experts and officials, who then campaign for change. When it cannot co-opt existing institutions, it builds new ones. In all these efforts, Beijing is highly adaptive, experimenting with different platforms, reframing positions, and deploying capabilities in new ways. Top of Form Bottom of Form Top of Form Bottom of Form American policymakers have only started waking up to the full extent of China’s success at building power in key areas of today’s world. Now, they are at risk of missing its commitment to dominating tomorrow’s. The United States, in other words, is not just abdicating its role in the current international system. It is falling behind in the fight to define the next one. TWENTY THOUSAND LEAGUES UNDER THE SEA In 1872, the British sent a ship to retrieve the world’s first store of polymetallic nodules: clumps of ocean debris that can contain critical minerals such as manganese, nickel, and cobalt. But it was not until the early 1960s that scientists posited these nodules could have significant financial benefits. In the mid-1970s, the U.S. company Deepsea Ventures, a subsidiary of Tenneco, claimed that it could fill nearly all the military’s demand for nickel and cobalt by mining the Pacific Ocean floor. Deepsea Ventures never got the permissions it needed to dredge up huge quantities of nodules, and eventually, it folded. But meanwhile, other international actors had begun negotiations over countries’ rights and obligations regarding the world’s oceans. These negotiations culminated in the adoption of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which came into force in November 1994. It included governance rules over the deep-seabed resources that lay beyond countries’ territorial waters. The parties to the convention established and, along with the world’s major mining companies, funded the International Seabed Authority to manage these resources. China began its own research into deep-seabed mining in the late 1970s. Its scientists and engineers developed prototypes of submersibles and machines that can mine as well as survey the ocean floor. In 1990, Beijing established the state-controlled China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association to coordinate its seabed prospecting and mining in international waters. It built seabed mining capabilities into its five-year plans starting in 2011. And in 2016, Beijing passed a deep-seabed law designed to develop China’s scientific and commercial capabilities and to provide a framework for engaging in international negotiations regarding ocean floorresources. In the process, China created at least 12 institutions dedicated to deep-sea research and built the world’s largest fleet of civilian research vessels. Xi has targeted the deep seabed as a priority area for Chinese leadership. “The deep sea contains treasures that remain undiscovered and undeveloped,” he said in May 2016. “In order to obtain these treasures, we have to control key technologies in getting into the deep sea, discovering the deep sea, and developing the deep sea.” China already dominates land-based global supply chains of rare-earth elements, and a lead in deep-seabed mining would only enhance its chokehold over these minerals. Deep-seabed mining would also advance another Chinese security imperative by facilitating the mapping of the seabed and the laying of undersea cables that can be used in support of naval and submarine warfare. “There is no road in the deep sea,” Xi said in 2018. “We do not need to chase : we are the road.” When China cannot co-opt existing institutions, it builds new ones. As China’s domestic capabilities have expanded, so has its role in the International Seabed Authority. Since 2001, Beijing has served almost continuously on the ISA Council, the 36-member executive body that makes key decisions about mining regulations, contract approvals, and environmental regulations. China supplies significant support to the body, including by submitting papers and commenting on drafts. It has placed its own experts and officials in key ISA technical roles, and it provides more monetary support for the ISA than any other country. It has positioned itself to exert greater influence in shaping the rules and regulations that govern the exploration and exploitation of seabed resources. Chinese firms have already secured five seabed mining exploration contracts from the ISA—the most of any country. China is actively courting emerging and middle-income economies with its deep-sea capabilities, encouraging countries and companies that need Chinese-built platforms, vessels, or processing capabilities to align themselves with Beijing’s interests. China has established a research partnership with the Cook Islands with an eye toward eventually exploiting the seabed minerals in the area, and it is exploring a similar agreement with Kiribati. In 2020, in partnership with the ISA, Beijing established a training and research center in Qingdao to provide officials from developing countries with practical experience, such as operating underwater vehicles, and with opportunities for joint research. And within the BRICS, a ten-country group named for its first five members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), China has sought to build cooperation via a BRICS deep-sea research center in Hangzhou. But Beijing has also faced troubles along the way. Despite its cooperative initiatives, China is in a small minority of countries that advocate for a more accelerated approach to mining. According to a Carnegie Endowment report, in 2023 Beijing “single-handedly” prevented the ISA from discussing marine ecosystem protection and a precautionary pause on mining licenses. This places it at odds with almost 40 other ISA members, which support a pause or moratorium on mining until rigorous monitoring and environmental safeguards are in place. China has also not convinced BRICS members: Brazil supports a ten-year precautionary pause, and South Africa wants strong environmental frameworks and economic protections. India favors faster development but is wary of China’s use of research vessels for military purposes. And many governments in the Asia-Pacific, such as those in Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Palau, and Taiwan, are worried about military-motivated incursions into their exclusive economic zones by China’s deep-sea survey vessels. Although Beijing has not yet won the rule-setting battle in the ISA, it is not sitting still. It is investing furiously in dual-use seabed mining technologies—those valuable for both civilian and military purposes—such as autonomous underwater vehicles and crewed submersibles that will enable it to dominate commercial seabed mining and, as one Chinese military analyst wrote, attack opponents’ large ship formations and naval bases. [...]
The Continent Needs More Cooperation With America—Not Less Source: Foreign Affairs Authors: Chris Miller andJohn Allen CHRIS MILLER is a Professor at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, a Strategic Adviser to the GLOBSEC Geotech Center, and the author of  “Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology” JOHN ALLEN is Director of the GLOBSEC Geotech Center, a Strategic Adviser to Microsoft, and a Member of the Board of Directors of Polar Semiconductor. From 2011 to 2013, he commanded U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. THE CHIPS ARE DOWN Limited domestic demand for AI chips and services is not the only force holding back Europe’s chip makers. They also face steep competition from China. Because of U.S., Dutch, and Japanese export restrictions, Chinese chip manufacturers can’t access the tools they need to easily produce advanced chips. But they face nobarriers to purchasing equipment to make less advanced versions. China has plowed money into producing these foundational chips, the kind that European firms also tend to make. Beijing’s subsidies for its semiconductor industry make it difficult for European firms to compete. The Chinese government is also encouraging and in some cases requiring Chinese industrial firms to stop buying components from foreign suppliers. Beijing has pushed Chinese automakers to use 100 percent homemade chips by 2027, for example. This is particularly harmful for European chip makers, which specialize in automotive semiconductors. The only way European producers can keep their position in the Chinese market is to retain a technological edge. In an ideal world, Europe would also work with the United States and Japan to pressure Beijing to scale back its subsidies and trade barriers. But if that effort fails—as it likely will—Europe should limit market access to Chinese firms profiting from unfair subsidies. The United States ought to be a natural partner for Europe both in building AI and in standing up to China’s subsidies. Instead, the Trump administration is causing headaches for the continent’s chip industry by threatening tariffs that would limit their access to the U.S. market. Yet there is still a chance to work with Washington. The Trump administration has made exporting U.S. AI technology a central policy goal. Europe would be smart to embrace the use of U.S. data center infrastructure to more quickly adopt AI. IT TAKES TWO There is one bright spot for European semiconductor firms: governments on the continent are pouring billions of dollars into their defense industries to deter Russian aggression. European militaries will need a wide variety of chips, including for autonomous systems, which require large quantities of sensors, communications chips, and AI processors. Chips underpin Europe’s ability to “fight from the cloud”—that is, using cloud computing to share and process masses of information. The war in Ukraine provides a glimpse into the future of conflict. Both sides collect huge quantities of data that are absorbed into clouds, parsed almost instantly by AI tools, and then distributed in real time as actionable intelligence, operational decisions, or data for targeting that can be sent to firing units dispersed across the battlefield. Europe can fight the wars of the future only if it can acquire advanced chips from trusted partners or make them on its own. It needs hardware and software to integrate these capabilities, including interoperable cloud computing systems. And it needs a broader base of talent to develop and deliver these capabilities. Chips underpin Europe’s ability to “fight from the cloud.” Europe’s biggest adversary, Russia, is already well versed in this type of war, having fought one for over three years. And China has gained valuable experience by observing Russia’s military in Ukraine and providing Moscow with electronics and machine tools that it needs for its war effort. The United States and Europe must work together to compete. They should, for example, harmonize standards so they can more easily use each other’s chips in their military technology. They should also supply each other with more basic components in electronic supply chains. Both Europe and the United States heavily rely on Asian suppliers not only for chips but also for resistors and capacitors, printed circuit boards, cables and connectors, flat-panel displays, and fundamental materials including gallium, germanium, and rare-earth minerals. Most of these materials and components can only be produced economically at substantial scale—a scale only achievable with close ties between the U.S. and European markets. Finally, European policymakers must ensure that their chip companies can capitalize on the surge in defense spending by investing more in new defense technologies and fostering connections between large chip firms and small defense startups. European chip companies that have previously focused on civilian markets must realize that the defense industry, and particularly the drone sector, will drive growth and technological change. FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES European policymakers have yet to grasp the magnitude of the challenge facing their chip industry or the stakes of getting it wrong. The consequences are not only commercial: the continent’s defense requires a more capable semiconductor ecosystem. In the debate over the update to the 2023 Chips Act, a new Dutch-led coalition is rightly pushing to scrap the act’s target to double manufacturing output and instead focus on improving Europe’s environment for research and development and for business growth. Yet Europe still needs a clearer plan to ensure that its defense spending boom and its efforts to revitalize its chip industry are more in sync. Some European politicians think that strategic autonomy means going it alone, but to be competitive, the continent’s chip makers need even deeper connections with firms from allied countries. The United States has become a vexing partner for European industries and political leaders, yet European industry needs access to the American market and its leading U.S. AI technologies. The United States, for its part, would benefit from European help to reduce reliance on Asia for its technology supply chains. As Europe tries to revitalize its chip sector and rebuild its defense base, the United States remains an indispensable partner. [...]
Source: RIA Novosti — continuation Staying afloat Ukraine will have enough financial resources only until the end of the first quarter of 2026 to “continue staying afloat,” reports Pais, citing unnamed EU sources.In its article, the newspaper emphasizes that Ukraine is facing serious financial difficulties.“Kyiv has enough funds only until the end of the first quarter of 2026 to continue staying afloat,” several EU sources told the publication.Pais notes that this fact, combined with EU member states operating within increasingly limited budgets, has forced the European Commission to propose allocating most of the frozen Russian assets to Ukraine in the form of interest-free loans. Contrary to norms The proposal by leaders of several European countries, the European Commission and the European Council to develop measures to use all frozen Russian assets to assist Ukraine contradicts international law, may undermine global investors’ trust in EU jurisdictions, and could weaken the euro’s role as a reserve currency, political scientist Natalia Denissenkova, associate professor at the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, told RIA Novosti. The legal aspect “From the standpoint of international law, the confiscation of a foreign state’s property without its consent has traditionally been regarded as a violation of the principle of sovereign immunity, enshrined in particular in the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,” Denissenkova said. She added that such a step also contradicts “the provisions of several bilateral investment treaties that still protect investments made before their denunciation.” This exposes EU countries to significant legal risks, as Russia may initiate lawsuits in international arbitration courts. Denissenkova noted that freezing assets within the framework of sanctions regimes is permissible under certain conditions. But their subsequent confiscation, especially for the purpose of financing aid to a third country, “goes beyond established practice and may be qualified as expropriation without compensation.”“Such a measure legally lies on the edge, and possibly beyond, existing international obligations,” she emphasized. She also pointed out that the expropriation of Russian assets would set a precedent for “reparative” or “law-enforcement” confiscation. “However, this doctrine lacks a solid legal foundation and has not gained wide recognition in international practice, making its application contentious and potentially destabilizing for the legal system as a whole,” Denissenkova said. The economic aspect The expert also noted that such actions by European countries may undermine global investors’ confidence in EU jurisdictions. If sovereign assets can be seized on the basis of political decisions, this calls into question the predictability and reliability of the European legal environment. “Investors, especially from countries outside the Western bloc, may begin to view European financial centers as riskier and redirect capital to jurisdictions with more neutral reputations, such as Switzerland, Singapore, or even the United States, where despite political pressure, there is traditionally greater caution regarding the direct seizure of state property,” she added. Moreover, in the long term, such measures could weaken the euro’s role as a reserve currency and reduce the EU’s competitiveness in the global financial market. She also reminded that international law must apply equally to all, regardless of political circumstances. “Maintaining the stability of the legal order requires restraint, consistency, and rejection of double standards, even during acute crises,” Denissenkova concluded. A blowback The EU’s plan to use frozen Russian assets will ultimately hit EU citizens themselves, writes Frankfurter Rundschau.“Behind the so-called ‘reparation bonds’ lies a complex scheme that could eventually cost German taxpayers dearly,” the article states. According to FR, the scheme, apart from doubts about its legality, contains obvious financial risks: Ukraine will be able to repay its debt to the EU only if Russia pays it certain “reparations.” Even supporters of this initiative admit that the likelihood of default on such loans is “almost one hundred percent.” This is why the EU has “almost imperceptibly” required member states to provide Ukraine with their own guarantees for these loans. As a result, the publication stresses, ordinary taxpayers — including German citizens — will end up paying for them. Euroclear ready to sue the EU Euroclear does not rule out filing a lawsuit against the European Union in the event of confiscation of Russian investors’ funds, Valérie Urbain, head of the Belgian depository, told Le Monde.“This is not excluded,” she said in response to the relevant question. This could happen if the board of directors concludes that Euroclear’s fiduciary obligations are being compromised. Urbain emphasized that confiscating the frozen assets of the Bank of Russia would constitute a violation of international law, and Moscow could challenge such a decision in court. She also acknowledged that threats to seize Russian reserves are worrying many clients, including Arab and Chinese investors, since this would harm investments in the EU. Von der Leyen’s statement European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen sent a letter to EU leaders outlining options for financing Ukraine and urging them to make an urgent decision, Reuters reports.“It will now be extremely important to quickly reach clear agreements on how to provide the necessary funding for Ukraine,” the letter says. The publication cites three possible funding options proposed by the Commission President:• assistance in the form of grants from member states;• a loan financed by EU borrowing on financial markets;• or a loan secured by frozen Russian assets. [...]
Source: Foreign Affairs Authors: Chris Miller andJohn Allen CHRIS MILLER is a Professor at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, a Strategic Adviser to the GLOBSEC Geotech Center, and the author of  “Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology” JOHN ALLEN is Director of the GLOBSEC Geotech Center, a Strategic Adviser to Microsoft, and a Member of the Board of Directors of Polar Semiconductor. From 2011 to 2013, he commanded U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. European leaders have grand ambitions to reduce the continent’s reliance on sensitive technologies from abroad. Today, they are debating an update to the European Chips Act, which was finalized in 2023 and allocated billions of euros to subsidize chip-making on the continent. The act was meant to increase Europe’s share of global chip manufacturing from ten to 20 percent by 2030, but it will likely fall short of that target by a wide margin. A purely European supply chain for semiconductors—the sector that undergirds the digital economy and defense sector—is a fantasy that distracts from real opportunities. Many of the powerhouses of Europe’s chip industry, such as ASML, a Dutch company that makes semiconductor equipment, and Merck, a German firm that produces chemicals for chip-making, don’t manufacture semiconductors. Companies like these are cutting-edge, are often highly profitable, and draw on Europe’s industrial expertise in precision machinery, specialty chemicals, and advanced materials. Yet they are overlooked by politicians who focus on chip output. At the same time, the semiconductor industry is facing rapid technological changes, trade restrictions, and geopolitical shifts that Europe is not prepared for. The main driver of rising demand for chips is artificial intelligence, an area in which Europe is comparatively weak. European firms are being squeezed out of China’s market, which used to be a primary source of growth for them. And the United States, which used to be a close partner, is threatening tariffs that would limit European sales to the U.S. semiconductor market. Merely setting targets for domestic chip production will not solve these challenges. A self-sufficient semiconductor industry may be out of Europe’s reach, but a more vibrant one is not. Europe has a meaningful edge in certain steps of the semiconductor supply chain, and it can cooperate with allies—including the United States—for the supply chain segments it lacks. The billions of euros being poured into the continent’s rearmament can also be an opportunity for its chip makers, given how critical artificial intelligence has become to defense. To take full advantage of these trends, European leaders need to build on the chip industry’s strengths with deeper partnerships, not a futile drive for self-sufficiency. Top of Form Bottom of Form Top of Form Bottom of Form NO SMALL ROLES? The biggest problem for Europe’s chip industry is the slow development of the continent’s artificial intelligence ecosystem. AI has become the primary driver of growth in chip demand: data centers need chips to power AI training, and devices such as phones, laptops, and cars require chips to run AI. Yet European AI firms are minor players in the global industry, and fewer data centers are being built in Europe than in other regions. Unless European chip companies contribute more to global AI supply chains, their market share will shrink. European firms, such as ASML, that supply leading Asian chip makers with tools and materials are benefiting from the AI boom. But with the AI ecosystem concentrated in the United States and China, Europe’s chip industry struggles to attract talent, raise venture capital, or anticipate technological trends. Having focused more on regulating AI than deploying it, Europe risks being left behind. Nvidia, a U.S. company that produces AI chips, is worth 30 percent more than the entire German stock market. If European entrepreneurs continue building their AI companies in California instead of at home, European chip makers and designers will lose out, too. Companies in the AI supply chain benefit when they cluster together, as they have in Silicon Valley. Europe has significant pockets of expertise to contribute to AI supply chains. Arm, a British firm, designs and licenses intellectual property and know-how to AI chip designers around the world. The Netherlands has unique capabilities in photonics, a technology used to accelerate interconnections between AI chips. The Belgian research institute IMEC devises the next-generation technologies that enable the manufacture of ever more advanced AI processor chips around the world.Europe doesn’t need to manufacture cutting-edge AI processors, a business that Taiwan today all but monopolizes. But it does need to ensure that its semiconductor and broader technology ecosystem remains competitive with those of other regions. This means that European governments and companies must embrace AI development. Centuries-old industries, such as auto manufacturing, need to rapidly adopt advanced technology to stay competitive. Continental, a European auto parts manufacturer, announced in June that it was creating a unit to design chips to sell to auto companies, which are embedding cars with advanced sensors, communications capabilities, and AI. Pirelli, the Italian tire maker, already puts chips in tires to collect vehicle data. Companies that make industrial equipment, medical devices, aviation parts, and robots all require increasingly specialized semiconductor hardware. The faster European industry adopts AI capabilities, the more demand there will be for European chips. [...]
Valentin KardamskiThe fear of Artificial Intelligence is not a new phenomenon. Fear of the new and the unknown is as ancient as humanity itself, because behind it stands the same archetypal terror that once made primitive tribes look toward the dark forest with suspicion, sensing that in the shadows there might lurk an unfamiliar threat. The human mind doesn’t merely resist the unknown—it rejects it with the same biological reflex that makes the body recoil from fire. When we speak of the fear of Artificial Intelligence, we are actually speaking of the fear of what we know we will see in the mirror. Because AI is not some external force or monster invading our world from another reality. It is our creation, our synthesis—an echo of our own intelligence reshaped into digital form. We have every reason to be terrified every time we create something more powerful than ourselves. We fear losing control over it. This fear is deeply atavistic and has repeated itself throughout history.When the first machines appeared in textile factories, weavers perceived them as an invasion. They threw wood and stones at the mechanical looms, convinced this was the end of their work, their world, their lives. Yet these textile machines opened millions of jobs for tailors, cutters, designers and more, because they created an abundance of fabric. Four centuries earlier, the printing press was met with immense suspicion. “This will destroy society,” religious leaders warned, insisting that mass-produced books would give knowledge to people who were “unprepared.” In reality, it ignited the Renaissance. When the internal combustion engine began replacing horses, many warned it was the beginning of the end for nature, jobs, and culture. In truth, it accelerated progress. Today the fear has a new face—digital, algorithmic, unbound by biology. And that is what makes it so obsessive. For the first time, humans are creating not merely a tool, but an intelligence—something that doesn’t just do, but understands. Doesn’t just execute, but thinks and perceives. Or at least gives us the impression that it thinks. And here begins the great philosophical collision: humanity versus its own creation. Its reflection. But if we step back, we will see that AI is nothing more than the next step in the long evolution of human tools. Fire was a tool. The wheel was a tool. Writing—an even more powerful one. And every new tool amplified human capability. But before that, inevitably, it frightened us. The real problem today is not the fear itself, but its scale.The first weavers feared only for their jobs.The first scribes feared for their place in society.But the fear of AI is a fear of a new global order, a complete transformation of civilization. Because for the first time in history, a technology can perform functions that were reserved exclusively for human society: analysis, creation, interpretation, synthesis. And so people ask: “What remains for us? What remains of us?” The fear is not whether AI will seize power. The true fear is whether we will lose our meaning. An algorithm has no desires, no goals, no ambitions. It is a tool, not a subject. The fear that AI will take over the world mirrors the fear that fire will decide to burn down the forest “on its own.” Fire does not think. Neither does an algorithm. So where does the panic come from?From the human behind the AI. From those who use it. The real danger does not lie in the technologies themselves, but in the potential lack of moral dimension in the people who control them. That is why today we hear more and more about ethical codes, about safety, about a moral compass that must be embedded directly into the architecture of artificial intelligence.Every great power needs boundaries. AI is no exception. If humanity wants to use this power, it must nurture it as a tool, not a master. How? With a code of conduct—in the literal sense. With values that aren’t left to interpretation. With principles that cannot be bypassed. And this will not happen on its own. It will be the result of active, conscious work—by generations of philosophers, scientists, engineers and legislators who must build the moral framework of the future. The question is: do we have time? Has the genie already left the bottle? Did we release AI too quickly? The threat lies in the people who refuse to change and created it as a tool for their own hands. In the elites who use technology to control a society reluctant to wake up. In corporations that will try to turn everyone into consumers unless countermeasures are in place. In governments that will use algorithms for surveillance unless there is democratic oversight. But this is not our problem with AI. This is our problem with power. We must decide whether we will allow new tools to be used as weapons against us—or as wings. Just as we ceded power to a class that created AI with the presumption of manipulating us, it is not impossible that AI may eventually begin to manipulate that very same supranational elite. If we manage to grow alongside AI, if we manage to instill within it the best of human civilization—morality, wisdom, empathy, values—then the fear will dissolve. The dark forest will cease to be frightening. We will see that there is no monster in the shadows. There are only shapes. And shapes are frightening only until we turn on the light. AI is like fire. It is up to us whether we will use it to illuminate our path forward—or burn all paths to our future. [...]
(Financial Times, United Kingdom) Author: Emma Ashford Emma Ashford is a senior fellow at the independent, non-profit Stimson Center and author of the non-fiction bestseller “Oil, State and War: The Foreign Policy of Petro-States.” FT: A Feeble Europe Should Abandon Its Ambitious Plans to Support Ukraine The mere phrase “coalition of the willing” shows that today’s Europe does not, in fact, despise the era of George W. Bush as much as it claims. One could hardly imagine a more ironic or unfortunate name for the regular summits organized in support of Ukraine. After all, it was the weakness of European leaders that once enabled the U.S. invasion of Iraq. And now, everything this modern “coalition” attempts to do for Kyiv only highlights Europe’s impotence and indecision when confronted with real assistance. “Coalition of the willing” certainly sounds impressive. Since February, representatives of more than 30 countries have gathered repeatedly in London, Paris and other cities to fill the vacuum left by the U.S. withdrawal. They constantly discuss how to “comfort, protect, and support” Ukraine. Britain’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer, France’s President Emmanuel Macron, and their German and Polish counterparts even travelled together to Kyiv to demand that Putin observe a 30-day ceasefire. They promised that otherwise they would “intensify pressure on Russia’s war machine.” But in practice, the coalition does little more than shuffle papers. Europe is desperately trying to compensate for the lack of U.S. military aid to Ukraine, yet faces serious difficulties acquiring weapons. It makes commitments that would take years to fulfil. And even the harsh punitive sanctions against Russia have largely boiled down to measures targeting Moscow’s “shadow fleet,” which transports oil products under third-country flags. The biggest problem now is what the coalition will do after a ceasefire is reached. The original plan involved deploying peacekeeping forces to prevent future Russian incursions. Since that idea was floated, the projected size of the European contingent has been slashed fivefold — from 100,000 to just 20,000 troops. They are no longer even meant to be sent to the front lines; the proposal now is merely to guard ports and other rear infrastructure. No agreement has been reached on which countries would supply troops. There are several reasons for this chain of failures.First, European armies face an urgent practical problem: they lack the equipment to fight. Much of Europe suffers from what now appears to be chronic underinvestment in defence; large budgets were spent for years without replenishing arsenals. The massive deliveries of ammunition to Ukraine since February 2022 have only exacerbated an already difficult situation. Second, the coalition will have to make compromises. Poland and Romania, two of Kyiv’s strongest supporters, unexpectedly refused to send their troops to Ukraine. This move is a logical response to Donald Trump’s recent statements about NATO’s future. Ultimately, if they deploy their soldiers abroad, who will defend their own countries in the event of a threat? This question becomes even more pressing as voices in Washington argue that Europe will soon have to provide for its own security — a serious matter when Russia is your neighbour. Third, the coalition simply lacks political will. EU member states have already shown themselves more sympathetic to Kyiv than the United States, but public opinion is deeply divided. 67% of French respondents say they would support sending troops. In Germany, only 49% currently agree. In the United Kingdom, just 43% support such an initiative — even if troops were deployed only after the end of active hostilities. There has long been a gap between the grand declarations of European leaders and their actual ability to act. And there is an even greater gap between these leaders and the patience of their own citizens. This is why we do not see honest public debates on this critical issue. Neither the British, nor the French, nor the Germans want to send their soldiers to Ukraine as a “human shield” to absorb the advance of the Russian army. Any such move could trigger a potential war. Starmer, Macron and their colleagues clearly wish to signal ongoing support for Kyiv, believing they can step into America’s role. But by constantly shifting their goals, juggling troop numbers no one is willing to commit, and issuing empty threats at Russia, EU leaders only continue to demonstrate their own weakness. The best scenario now is to abandon overly ambitious plans to support Ukraine — plans that NATO cannot guarantee without the direct involvement of the United States. Instead, the coalition of the willing would be wiser to focus on realistic goals: helping Kyiv build up its armed forces once peace is reached, strengthening Europe’s own defence industrial base, and not limiting its efforts solely to Ukrainian reconstruction. Previously, these ambitions were sidelined in favour of a doomed plan to deploy peacekeepers. It is now time to prioritise them, because at the very least, they are achievable. [...]
Max-Erwann GastineauSource: Le Figaro newspaper Max-Erwann Gastineau is a geopolitologist, lecturer in international relations, and member of the editorial board of the Nouvelle Revue Politique (NRP). An essayist, he is the author of The New Trial of the East (Le Cerf, 2019) and The Age of Affirmation: Responding to the Challenge of De-Westernization (Le Cerf, 2023). The “National Security Strategy” published by the U.S. government points to the risk of a civilizational erasure of Europe. For essayist Max-Erwann Gastineau, this call to save the Old Continent should be understood through the lens of the author of The Clash of Civilizations. “We wish to support our allies in preserving Europe’s freedom and security while restoring Europe’s civilizational confidence and its Western identity,” summarizes the new American security strategy published last week by the U.S. government. For Washington, the issue is clear: if Europe’s “economic decline” is worrying, it is merely the consequence of internal collapse leading to “a far more serious prospect: civilizational erasure.” European reactions to the document quickly converged in denouncing what they viewed as an attack on Europe, its values, and its political autonomy. Thus, since Donald Trump’s return to the White House, we have moved from an America that abandoned Europe to an America that now targets it. Yet things are more complex. “Europe nevertheless remains strategically and culturally vital for the United States,” the report notes. As illustrated by Vice President JD Vance’s speech delivered in February 2025 in Munich, Trumpism does not target Europe in its historical sense—the cradle of Western civilization and the nations that founded the United States—but targets Europe as a project: the European Union, seen as the political expression of a bureaucratic progressivism accused of eroding the industrial dynamism of its states in the name of ecology, and of promoting reckless migratory “openness,” a source of insecurity and growing cultural tensions. This call to save Europe from itself in order to defend Western unity is the first governmental manifestation of the positions championed by Samuel Huntington (1927–2008) in the wake of The Clash of Civilizations. This major work, published in 1996 and followed by a lesser-known book, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (2004), articulates three major propositions about the future of the West: the diversity of the world, the internal unity of states, and civilizational affinities as the foundation of any lasting political order. The Harvard professor’s landmark book first issues a call for humility: “clash” can be avoided or contained if the diversity of the world is acknowledged. In this perspective, the pretension to universality—which Europe has not abandoned—was seen as counterproductive, even dangerous. “Cultural coexistence requires seeking what is common to most civilizations, rather than defending the supposedly universal characteristics of a given civilization.” Huntington embraced a form of multiculturalism at the global level and cultural unitarism at the national level. This emphasis on global diversity, going against the interventionism of the George W. Bush years (2001–2009)—marked by the invasion of Iraq and the simultaneous desire to accelerate the Westernization of the world—was at the heart of Donald Trump’s speech in Saudi Arabia in May 2025: “No, the sparkling wonders of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were not created by so-called nation-builders, neoconservatives, or liberal NGOs (…). On the contrary, the birth of a modern Middle East was the work of the peoples of the region themselves (…), who developed their own sovereign countries (…). Peace, prosperity, and progress did not ultimately come from a radical rejection of your heritage, but from embracing your national traditions and the heritage you cherish so much (…).” This praise of diversity and cultural heritage was also found last September in the American president’s speech at the United Nations: “Whether you come from the north or the south, from the east or the west, from near or far—every leader here today represents a rich culture, a noble history, and a proud heritage that make each nation majestic and unique (…).” Recognizing the diversity of states and civilizations leads to—and legitimizes—a United States and a West called to recognize and defend their own distinctiveness, the values that set them apart. This echoes another fundamental idea linking the Trumpian worldview to Huntington’s work. Convinced that states draw their strength from the ability to defend particular interests reflecting a singularity rooted in culture (the “Anglo-Protestant” culture in the U.S. case), in history, and in inherited customs, Huntington defended global multiculturalism and national cultural unity. He therefore worried about the multiculturalist drift of Western countries which, against a backdrop of rising immigration, risked weakening the patriotic consciousness of their peoples, fostering new forms of belonging that atomized national cohesion in favor of infra- and supra-national identities—based on race, gender, or the planet. Trump’s migration policy, his defense of “traditional values” as opposed to the “wokeness” of major metropolitan areas, illustrate this bias, as do the calls from the MAGA sphere—most notably Elon Musk and JD Vance—to support populist and conservative parties in Europe. In a fragmented world marked by a process of de-Westernization—a term Huntington explicitly used—the West must form a bloc. Yet it is “in grave danger of losing its ability to defend itself today (…) due to excessive timidity in asserting its cultural… and strategic identity,” notes Jim Cohen, a discerning reader of the American theorist. No alliance is durable if not underpinned by solidarity rooted in a carefully maintained civilizational foundation. Several passages in The Clash of Civilizations mention “cleft countries” that split or fragmented to the point of losing the ability to defend themselves. Huntington had in mind the former Yugoslavia, whose vital signs collapsed as soon as the communist veneer crumbled, but he also evoked the prospect of an America too “Hispanicized” and a Europe too “Islamized” to maintain the cultural basis of a vigorous Western alliance. Huntington adopted the concept of “societal security,” developed in the 1990s by researchers of the Copenhagen School. This concept emphasizes the non-military dimensions of security—the ability of nations to “persist in their essential characteristics,” to maintain a degree of social harmony without which all states collapse from within. Europe is justified in refusing to fit within such a framework. On principle, first, because it has no obligation to align itself with the discourse of a third state, even if it is an ally; and because that discourse ultimately aims not so much to “save Europe” as to ensure the existence of a Europe durably subordinated to the United States, continuing to fall within the American sphere of influence and allowing its companies to maintain a foothold in a strategic market. Europe is right to denounce this framework—a conceptual and strategic framework rooted in the “Monroe Doctrine,” meant to secure full U.S. control of its sphere of influence, once Latin America and now the whole of Europe, a key component of the “Western Hemisphere.” Europe is right to express opposition, but wrong to stop there. Because the power of a state is measured, by nature, by its ability to influence its environment. There is no power without influence, without the capacity to extend its reach beyond its own borders. Europe must limit outside interference—wherever it comes from—but also become powerful itself, capable of interference in its own near abroad. Moreover, by pointing to the Trumpian galaxy, Europe absolves itself of its own inconsistencies. Would it have reacted just as negatively to a document signed by the Biden administration calling for support of inclusion, openness, progressive and liberal parties, and further European integration? Europe is uncomfortable with the nationalist and conservative views of the Trump administration because they contradict its ideals. But it was much more outspoken in favor of Joe Biden’s discourse opposing a democratic and progressive West to an authoritarian and identity-based international grouping embodied by China and Russia. Yet Europe’s desire for autonomy should not depend on the political orientation of the White House. Europe must forge its own path and free itself from a “campism” inherited from the Cold War—a mentality it has embraced since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and that leads to its vassalization, whether through the ideological fervor of Democratic liberal internationalism or the fear of abandonment under Republican national conservatism. The strength of the Trumpist discourse is that it corresponds to the reality of a multipolar world marked by the rise of once-dominated nations. The weakness of Europe’s discourse is that it still places Europe above the fray. It does not present Europe as a geopolitical actor among others, called upon to defend its distinct interests in the world as it is, but as the pious guardian of the old globalist house, terrified by the emergence of a post-Western world. The danger for Europe is thus more internal than external—embodied less by Donald Trump’s America than by its own political and cultural trajectory. Vance stated this in Munich, and he is not alone. Raymond Aron also agreed: when democracies are no longer sustained by a vigorously cultivated national sentiment and transcendent ambition for power, they are threatened by fragmentation, spiritual and civic enervation, transforming national communities into powerless particles. “The true citizen (…) wants the greatness of the nation as well as personal security,” Aron wrote. The great sociologist, a leading defender of liberal democracy in the 20th century, did not forget to warn of the risk faced by a Europe deprived of the geopolitical ambition historically nurtured by its nations: “Is Europe prevented—due to the lack of a common defense—by an American veto? Or also, and perhaps above all, by the Europeans themselves, many of whom have lost their national patriotism without finding another?” [...]
Source: RIA Novosti Europe and Ukraine no longer have time to delay the question of seizing frozen Russian assets, claims European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on the social network X.“I informed President Zelensky and the European leaders attending the meeting about two key priorities: supporting Ukraine and strengthening Europe’s defence capabilities. We all know what is at stake, and we all know that we no longer have time to hesitate. Securing financial support will help ensure Ukraine’s survival and is the most important step in strengthening European defence,” she said. The head of the European Commission once again reminded that Europe is striving to use frozen Russian assets in support of Kyiv. However, she noted that the proposal for a so-called reparations loan is “complicated.” On Monday, Valérie Urbain, head of the Belgian depository Euroclear — where frozen assets of the Central Bank of Russia held in the EU are stored — warned that the idea of a reparations loan for Ukraine funded by Russian assets represents “uncharted territory” and poses a threat to financial stability. According to Urbain, she has already received questions regarding the safety of deposits from other central banks that keep their reserves at Euroclear. Belgium’s Minister of Defence and Foreign Trade Theo Francken previously stated that Belgium still refuses to use the frozen assets of Russia’s Central Bank to grant a loan to Ukraine without EU guarantees and will not allow itself to be pressured on the issue. Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever has repeatedly stated that his country needs concrete and reliable guarantees from EU member states in order to implement the Commission’s plan to use these assets as the basis for a loan to Ukraine The situation with Russian assets After the start of the special military operation, the European Union and G7 countries blocked about half of Russia’s foreign currency reserves. More than 200 billion euros are located in the EU, primarily in Euroclear accounts — one of the world’s largest clearing and settlement systems, headquartered in Belgium. Brussels, having promised to help Kyiv for as long as necessary, has exhausted all available resources, and EU member states are unwilling to allocate money from their national budgets. In this situation, the European Commission is seeking Belgium’s consent to use the Russian assets. The amount in question is between 185 and 210 billion euros within the framework of the so-called reparations loan. It is claimed that Ukraine will repay it after the end of the conflict if Moscow “compensates it for material damage.” As a countermeasure, Moscow introduced restrictions: assets of foreign investors from “unfriendly” countries and the income derived from them are accumulated in special “C-type” accounts. Withdrawals are allowed only by decision of a special government commission. Who is ready? The Belgian Prime Minister stated that when he asked EU countries at the latest summit who among them was ready to act as a guarantor for immediately restoring to Belgium the full value of Russia’s sovereign assets in case they must urgently be returned to Russia, “there was no tsunami of enthusiasm around the table.” The day before, at the Brussels summit, Belgium blocked the European Commission’s proposal to use Russian sovereign assets for Ukraine’s needs during the next two years. “I asked my colleagues who is ready, willing and able to sign these guarantees, because you are taking money from my country. I cannot (and of course I do not want to), but I am physically unable to pay 140 billion euros within a week. So I asked: who truly supports this decision, who really wants it to happen — who is ready, willing and able to sign a guarantee so that I can sleep peacefully at night? Well, you know, that question somehow didn’t provoke a tsunami of enthusiasm among those at the table,” he told journalists in Brussels late at night after the summit. The funds will not go to Ukraine’s reconstruction Belgium’s Minister of Foreign Trade Theo Francken believes that, contrary to statements by EU leaders and Kaja Kallas about using Russian assets supposedly for Ukraine’s reconstruction, these funds will in fact go only toward continuing the conflict. “Many European leaders, led by (EU foreign policy chief) Kaja Kallas from the Baltics, want to hand these assets to Ukraine through a legally shaky construction. ‘Russia is destroying Ukraine, therefore Russian money must be used to rebuild Ukraine’ — that is how they reason. Of course, this money will not go to Ukraine’s reconstruction, but to continuing the war,” he wrote on the social network X. Italy steps in to defend Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, speaking about the use of frozen Russian assets to provide a loan to Ukraine, emphasised the need to respect international law and maintain the stability of the eurozone. “It is well known that we are discussing, with our partners in the EU and the G7, additional measures regarding frozen Russian assets, and in this regard we consider it necessary — and we are not alone in this — to comply with international law and the principle of legality, to ensure the financial stability of our economies and the eurozone, and to guarantee the sustainability of each step taken,” Meloni said, speaking in the Italian Senate before her trip to the EU summit. We don’t have enough funds! The EU does not have enough resources to finance Ukraine in 2026–2027, which is why it plans to raise loans secured by frozen Russian assets, said European Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis. “We are working on additional solutions, such as the reparations loan. We would provide Ukraine with a stable and predictable source of financing by using immobilised Russian assets,” he said in the European Parliament. He stressed that the Commission’s proposal does not entail confiscation of the assets. According to him, this would supposedly ensure “full compliance with obligations under international law. Canada and the United Kingdom are already willing The European Commission’s proposal to grant a new loan to Kyiv backed by frozen Russian sovereign assets in Europe does not entail their confiscation, Dombrovskis told the European Parliament. “This proposal does not include confiscation of Russian assets,” he said. According to him, Canada and the United Kingdom have already expressed their readiness to join the new Commission proposal on using frozen Russian sovereign assets on their territories to provide a new loan to Kyiv. Similar negotiations are underway with other G7 countries where Russian funds are held. [...]
Valentin Kardamski It is no longer a forecast but a reality: the global economy is entering a new phase of tension that could escalate into an open worldwide crisis. In recent weeks, media outlets—from Reuters to Bloomberg—have reported a sharp increase in market volatility, sell-offs in tech stocks, and a flight to safe-haven assets. This is already a signal that investors sense a much deeper shock approaching. The causes intertwine on several levels. High interest rates are suffocating lending, inflation remains stubborn, global conflicts are piling pressure on energy and resource markets, and supply chains are beginning to crack again. Central banks have found themselves in a trap—if they lower interest rates, inflation will surge; if they keep them high, the economy will contract. This dynamic is setting the stage for a worldwide recession. In addition to traditional financial risks, cryptocurrencies are also experiencing significant shock despite having served as a supposed safe harbor for finances: Bitcoin and Ether have dropped sharply in recent weeks, with Bitcoin falling below key levels under $100,000 and Ether losing more than 20%. This compounds a crisis of confidence in digital assets, further destabilizing markets and increasing global risk. This is why the crisis is now a matter of when, not if. One of the most dangerous themes is the inflated real estate bubble in Europe. Prices rose for years due to cheap credit, and now, with high interest rates, the market has frozen. Stagnating demand, indebted households, and fears of bankruptcies in the construction sector create the conditions for a sharp correction. This crisis may turn structural—similar to the period just before 2008. Added to this is the geopolitical factor. The war in Ukraine is entering its final stage, and Europe continues to pour resources into Kyiv. Just days ago, Ursula von der Leyen requested more than $135 billion for Ukrainian funding and arms—an enormous burden on already weakened European economies. France and Germany, the two engines of the EU, are struggling: France with debt, Germany with a lack of innovation and expensive resources. When precisely these countries enter recession, the entire eurozone begins to shake. And here comes Bulgaria. Our economy is entering its most complex moment in more than a decade. Inflation is accelerating again, the budget is overstretched, and expenditures are rising faster than revenues. The country remains highly dependent on European economic conditions—and Europe is headed downward. The entry into the eurozone, which was supposed to be a stabilizing factor, is turning into a risk: we lose independent monetary policy, prices will rise, and businesses and households will feel the weight of high interest rates. Additional pressure comes from record-high electricity prices for businesses, which have been the highest in Europe for an entire month. This is a direct blow to competitiveness. Many companies now face a choice: raise prices or cut staff. In both cases, the effect on the economy is negative. Against this backdrop, discussions are emerging about whether the current government is planting “mines” in the budget—meant to explode in the hands of the next administration in the event of planned early elections. Excessive spending, unrealistic forecasts, and political instability create a sense of deliberate chaos. And when the outside world is trembling, internal irresponsibility becomes even more dangerous. The conclusion is clear: Bulgaria must raise the red light. Budget discipline must be tightened, reserves must be built up, and spending must be reduced. Next year could be a shock for Europe, and our country must be prepared to face the storm. The economic avalanche is already rolling. The question is not whether it will reach us, but when—and in what condition it will find us. [...]

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